Modeling attack helicopter operations in theater level simulations by Hume, Robert S.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1996-06
Modeling attack helicopter operations in theater level simulations
Hume, Robert S.
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/32088
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA 
THESIS 
MODELING ATTACK HELICOPTER 
OPERATIONS IN THEATER LEVEL 
SIMULATIONS 
by 
Robert S. Hume 
June 1996 
Thesis Advisor: Mark A. Youngren 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
DTIC QUALITY INBPE!JTED :5 
19961024 033 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Fonn Approved OM:B No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data 
sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other 
aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and 
Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
I. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
June 1996 Master's Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE MODELING ATTACK HELICOPTER 5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
OPERATIONS IN THEATER LEVEL SIMULATIONS 
6. AUTHOR(S) Robert S. Hume 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING 
Naval Postgraduate School ORGANIZATION 
Monterey CA 93943-5000 REPORT NUMBER 
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the 
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DIS1RIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) 
This thesis describes an attack helicopter module for the Joint Warfare Analysis Experimental 
Prototype (JWAEP), a joint theater level, low resolution stochastic simulation developed at the 
Naval Postgraduate School. The modeling formulations, required data, and assumptions which 
are required to portray attack helicopter operations in theater level simulations are presented. 
The focus for the attack module is the representation of attack helicopter units in the conduct 
of deliberate attacks; however, many of the models described can be applied to general 
helicopter operations. The formulations are limited to the major events that occur during an 
attack helicopter deliberate attack and represent initial research to portray attack helicopter 
operations in JW AEP. 
14. SUBJECT TERMS Army Aviation, Combat Models, Theater Level Simulations 15. NUMBER OF 
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICA- 18. SECURITY CLASSIFI- 19. 





16. PRICE CODE 
SECURITY CLASSIFICA- 20. LIMITATION OF 




Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) 
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 298-102 
ii 
Author: 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
MODELING ATTACK HELICOPTER OPERATIONS 
IN THEATER LEVEL SIMULATIONS 
RobertS. Hume 
Major, United States Army 
B.S., United States Military Academy, West Point, 1985 
Submitted in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF SCIENCE IN OPERATIONS RESEARCH 
from the 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
Robert S. Hume 
Approved by: 
Frank C. Petho, Chairman 




This thesis describes an attack helicopter module for the Joint Warfare Analysis 
Experimental Prototype (JWAEP), a joint theater level, low resolution stochastic 
simulation developed at the Naval Postgraduate School. The modeling 
formulations, required data, and assumptions which are required to portray attack 
helicopter operations in theater level simulations are presented. The focus for the 
attack module is the representation of attack helicopter units in the conduct of 
deliberate attacks; however, many of the models described can be applied to general 
helicopter operations. The formulations are limited to the major events that occur 
during an attack helicopter deliberate attack and represent initial research to portray 
attack helicopter operations in JW AEP. 
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This thesis describes an attack helicopter module for the Joint Warfare Analysis 
Experimental Prototype (JWAEP), a joint theater-level, stochastic combat simulation 
developed at the Naval Postgraduate School. The formulations presented address the specific 
issues of portraying attack helicopter units conducting deliberate attacks but the general 
results can be applied to the representation of all helicopter forces. 
The representation of helicopter operations in theater level combat simulations is an 
area that needs improvement. Many low resolution simulations fail to model helicopter forces 
or model these forces in the same way as fixed-wing aircraft. This thesis represents the initial 
research in the formulation of models to represent helicopter operations in JW AEP and is an 
attempt to begin to address the current shortcomings in existing models. 
The model formulations presented are based on U.S. Army Aviation doctrine and tactics 
but also allow the portrayal of helicopter forces that are employed differently. The scope of 
the thesis is limited to the representation of the basic attack helicopter unit (the attack 
helicopter battalion), helicopter movement in the user defined network, and the major events 
that take place during the conduct of a deliberate attack mission. The events described 
include the selection of optimal ingress and egress flight paths to and from the target area, 
mission force size determination, maintenance attrition, en route attrition, objective area 
attrition, and the mission planning cycle and logistical considerations. 
A demonstration of model results is shown for the most important areas, the selection 
of the optimal flight path based on distance and enemy air defense threat, and the adjudication 
of objective area attrition. All other formulations are accompanied by specific numerical 
examples to illustrate how the models are applied. Face validity is addressed with the 
numerical examples and demonstrated results presented but further testing needs to be 
completed before the module is validated. The module can only be verified when it is coded 






The purpose of this thesis is to describe an attack helicopter module for the Joint 
Warfare Analysis Experimental Prototype (JWAEP), a joint theater-level, aggregated, low 
resolution simulation developed at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). Army aviation is 
not currently represented in the simulation and the source code requires modifications and 
additions to accurately portray helicopter operations. The module described in this thesis 
addresses the modeling of attack helicopter units conducting deliberate attacks but the 
general results can be applied to the representation of all helicopter forces. 
The attack helicopter module is based on current U.S. Army aviation doctrine for 
attack helicopter operations but will have the flexibility to portray attack helicopter forces 
which are used and employed in different ways. The module allows for the portrayal of "Red" 
attack helicopter forces as well as "Blue" forces and is capable of reflecting future doctrinal 
changes as tactics are refined and updated and attack helicopter technology evolves. The 
doctrinal foundations of attack helicopter operations are discussed in Chapter II. Specific 
modeling formulations are addressed in Chapter ill in addition to the required supporting data 
that allow for the representation of attack helicopter operations in the simulation. Major 
areas described include unit representation, unit movement, air route selection, attrition 
adjudication, logistics, and mission cycles. Modeling formulations are demonstrated in 
Chapter IV to include a discussion of results. Chapter V is the conclusion with 
implementation recommendations and a discussion of areas for further study. 
B. BACKGROUND 
The Joint Warfare Analysis Experimental Prototype (JWAEP) is an interactive, 
two-sided, theater level combat model based on an arc-node representation of ground, air and 
littoral combat. It can be run in an interactive gaming mode or a closed-form stochastic 
analysis mode. The level of detail used in JW AEP is appropriate to represent battalion to 
brigade sized maneuver units, flight groups, and major combatant vessels. JW AEP is a 
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software prototype developed by the Naval Postgraduate School for research and 
experimentation in command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) centered 
approaches to modeling theater -level combat. 
Ground warfare is executed upon the arc-node representation of the key terrain, 
objectives, defensive points and maneuver corridors. Units have the ability to move through 
the network according to appropriate movement rates and terrain restrictions that are based 
on the size and maneuver capabilities of each unit. Attrition is assessed through the 
COSAGE/ATCAL process developed at the U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency.* 
Air warfare is executed on a separate air grid. The air space within a theater of 
operations is divided into a user -defined grid, the air grid. Each grid square represents the 
volume of air from the ground up within the geographic area enclosed by the square. Air-to-
air engagements are fought when aircraft encounter each other in a grid square; surface to air 
and air to surface engagements are fought between flights within an air grid and any ground 
targets or weapon systems on the terrain underlying the grid. The air grid is represented in 
the model as a node with direct connectivity to the eight adjacent nodes. Given the air 
structure, aircraft can choose a "least cost" path through the network to move to an 
engagement/target area and return. The air-to-air and air-to-surface engagements are 
adjudicated using the attrition mechanisms in the Air Forces Studies and Analysis Activity's 
THUNDER model. Surface-to-air engagements are adjudicated using a high resolution 
algorithm developed at NPS based on THUNDER algorithms. 
The littoral warfare module is currently under development. (Youngren and Lovell, 
1996) 
* COSAGE (Combat Sample Generator): A stochastic division level model used to generate engagement input 
data for use in A TCAL. The input data is generated based on a specific area of operations and opposing 
forces. ATCAL 0n Attrition Model Using Calibrated Parameters): An attrition model in which calculations are 
made using high resolution results - results of a simulation resolved down to the interactions between individual 
weapons. It provides a loss-by-cause table (killer victim scoreboard), allocation of fire among all shooter and 
target types, expenditures of ammunition, and the relative importance of all weapons. [US Army Concepts 
Analysis Agency, CAA-TP-83-3, August 1983] 
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C. THE PROBLEM 
The current version ofJWAEP, Version 2.0, does not explicitly model Army aviation 
helicopter forces and the model structure does not allow for the realistic representation of 
attack helicopter forces and their employment in the deep, close, and rear battle areas. 
Attack helicopters are only listed as separate entities in the equipment lists of the major 
ground units which are division level and higher. The model does not allow for the formation 
or employment of helicopter units capable of independent movement. Attack helicopters are 
represented as additional weapon systems that contribute to the combat effectiveness of the 
parent ground unit. That is, they are combat multipliers that contribute to the close fight. 
Deep operations conducted by organic ground maneuver forces have partial 
representation. The deep attack can be conducted by weapons such as long range artillery 
or attack helicopters but the simulation only portrays artillery. The traditional definition of a 
deep attack or deep strike implies an attack that is conducted across the front line of troops, 
deep into enemy territory, and normally beyond the range of friendly ground force direct fire 
support. The term "deep" for the purposes of this thesis will be used to define a strike against 
any enemy force that is not currently engaged by friendly ground forces. 
There is no representation of helicopter maneuver. Helicopter forces plan for and 
maneuver on appropriate avenues of approach like any ground unit. The added dimension 
of flight increases their speed, mobility and vulnerability. Attack helicopter units must be able 
to maneuver as independent units to conduct doctrinal attack operations. 
D. ATTACK HELICOPTER MISSION SCENARIO 
A scenario will be used throughout the thesis to demonstrate how the modeling 
techniques discussed can be applied to a typical attack helicopter mission. This section will 
outline a mission, "Blue" and "Red" forces, and a tactical situation that will form the basis for 
all examples used to explain specific modeling techniques. This scenario is based on 
Department of the Army FM 1-112, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Attack 
Helicopter Battalion, 1991. 
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1. Concept of the Operation 
The Attack Helicopter Battalion (ATKHB) is part of a ''Blue" corps aviation brigade. 
Corps offensive operations begin at D-Day. The corps electronic warfare priority will shift 
on D+3 to support suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) for corps deep attacks against 
2nd echelon forces. The attack helicopter regiment has been given the mission to conduct 
deep attacks to destroy the "Red Force" 2nd echelon tank division, the 22nd Guards Tank 
Division, at D+3 or D+4. Attack helicopter forces are typically used in deep attacks against 
follow-on, high-payoff targets that are critical to the corps commander's campaign plan. 
Deep attacks are directed against enemy forces that are not currently eng~ged but could 
influence division or corps close operations within the next 24 to 72 hours (FM1-112, 1991, 
p. 3-34). 
2. The ATKHB Mission 
The 1-24 ATKHB will conduct a deliberate deep attack to destroy the 22nd TD 
Independent Tank Regiment (22nd ITR) in Engagement Area Kill (EA Kill) at D+3. 
(ATKHBs require at least 24-48 hours to plan a deep attack mission.) 
3. The Blue ATKHB 
The size and organizational structure of an attack helicopter battalion can vary 
depending on the level at which it exists, the type of attack aircraft assigned, or the missions 
it will perform. The ATKHB depicted in Table 1.1 represents a typical corps or division 
heavy attack battalion based on the current Army Aviation Restructure Initiative. 
ATKHB Attack Companies AIRCRAFT MAX ANTI-TANK 
GUIDED MISSILES 
A Company 8AH-64 128 Hellfire 
B Company 8AH-64 128 Hellfire 
C Company 8AH-64 128 Hellfire 
Table 1.1 ATKHB Combat Force. 
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4. The Red Force 
The 22nd ITR has a tank heavy force with a total of 150 combat vehicles and is 
depicted in Table 1.2. 
VEHICLES NUMBER 
Tanks I30 T80 
I Section Rgmt ADA 2ZSU, 2 SA13 
I Section MRD ADA 2 SA6 TEL, I Radar 
Mechanized Vehicles I4 BMP2 
Table 1.2 22nd ITR Combat Force. 
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II. ARMY AVIATION 
A. ROLE OF ARMY AVIATION 
Army aviation (helicopter) forces have the flexibility, versatility, and capability to 
perform as maneuver, combat support, and combat service support forces. Army aviation 
essential tasks include: supporting the force commander's battle plan, supporting forces in 
contact, synchronizing force operations, and sustaining force operations (FM1-100, 1989, 
p. 1-7). Army aviation's role as a maneuver force conducting attack helicopter operations 
is the focus of this thesis. 
Combat aviation maneuver forces, which are usually brigade sized, exist within three 
major combat unit organizations: Theater or Echelons Above Corps (EAC), Corps, and 
Division. Each aviation brigade normally has subordinate attack helicopter battalions which 
are capable of independent mission planning and execution. Attack helicopter units are used 
in close, deep, and rear operations but their allocation and use differ depending on the level 
of their parent ground maneuver headquarters. The EAC, corps, and division ground force 
commander's intent, operational or tactical objectives, and priority mission support 
requirements will dictate how their respective attack helicopter units are used (FM1-1 00, 
1989, p. 1-12). 
There are normally different priorities and operational/tactical objectives at each level 
of command that govern how, when, and where attack helicopters are deployed. EAC level 
forces have a strategic-operational perspective of the battlefield and their aviation forces are 
tailored for the specific theater. If an EAC aviation brigade has a subordinate attack 
helicopter battalion, it is normally used to support corps and division operations. The 
majority of attack helicopter battalions or regiments are located in corps level commands 
where the focus is operational and tactical. The primary missions for corps attack helicopter 
battalions include counterattacking enemy penetrations of regimental size and conducting 
deep attacks to destroy enemy second-echelon formations before they can influence the close 
fight. The focus at the division level is tactical and division attack helicopter battalions are 
primarily used to support close operations. (FM1-1 00, 1989) 
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B. AVIATION EMPLOYMENT PRINCIPLES 
Army aviation forces are modeled after maneuver ground force elements, not Close 
Air Support squadrons.* Therefore, the doctrinal employment principles for Army aviation 
units are similar to those of conventional ground forces. Aviation employment guidelines 
outlined in Department ofthe Army FM1-100, 1989, include: 
Fight as an integral part of the combined arms team Exploit firepower 
Exploit the capabilities of other services Mass forces 
Capitalize on intelligence-gathering services Exploit mobility 
Suppress enemy weapons and acquisition means Maintain flexibility 
Use terrain for survivability Exploit surprise 
Displace forward elements frequently Exercise staying power. 
Command and control of Army aviation assets always stays with maneuver force 
commanders. Aviation units are placed in one of three command relationships: assigned, 
attached, or operational control (OPCON). The assigned relationship refers to a relatively 
permanent condition. Aviation battalions and companies are normally assigned to an aviation 
brigade. The attached relationship is usually for a short duration and is temporary in nature. 
A prime example of this is the attachment of a corps attack helicopter battalion to a division 
aviation brigade to support an offensive initiative. The OPCON relationship is also temporary 
in nature and is usually used when aviation maneuver forces are employed with or by 
members of the combined arms team. An attack helicopter battalion, for example, can be 
placed under the OPCON of a ground maneuver brigade or higher-level commander to 
support a specific mission. Aviation forces are normally not placed under OPCON below 
brigade level. (FM1-100, p. 2-2) 
* This is true for U.S. Army Aviation Forces but may not apply to other helicopter forces. The Soviet 
employment ofMI-8 and Ml-24 attack helicopters for close air support during the Soviet-Afghan War provides 
a prime counter example. It is notable, however, that Soviet attack helicopter use and tactics changed during 
the course of the war in response to refined and changing tactics of the Mujahideen. [Baumann, Robert F., The 
Soviet-Afghan War, 1979-1989, from Combat Studies Reading Book, December, 1991, pp. 395-435, CGSOC 
MIS 62114 Readings Book, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas] 
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C. THE ATTACK HELICOPTER BATTALION 
The attack helicopter battalion (ATKHB) is the basic unit for attack helicopter forces. 
The ATKHB is a combat maneuver unit which is employed to conduct supporting attacks to 
aid, protect, and complement other maneuver forces. The ATKHB allows the force 
commander to mass combat power rapidly at the decisive time and place to influence the 
outcome of a battle. 
The ATKHB fights as part of a combined arms team, coordinating its attacks with 
other maneuver, combat support, combat service support, and joint and combined forces, to 
overwhelm and surprise the enemy at the point of attack. Attacks may be conducted to 
support close operations or the "deep" fight, but are always synchronized with the ground 
force scheme ofmaneuver. (FM1-112, 1991, p. 1-2) 
1. The Mission 
The mission of the ATKHB is to destroy massed enemy mechanized forces and other 
forces using aerial firepower, mobility, and shock effect. The attack battalion is also used to 
conduct Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) operations, coordinate and adjust 
indirect fire, conduct reconnaissance and security operations, conduct offensive and defensive 
air combat, destroy enemy communication and logistical assets, and conduct joint air attacks 
with TACAIR and Field Artillery (FM1-112, 1991, p. 1-3). 
Every attack unit has a unique mission essential task list (METL) that supports parent 
unit mission priorities and can include a variety of the missions listed above. The METL is a 
prioritized list of mission tasks that is designed to focus the training efforts of the unit. The 
METL contains the most critical tasks that must be performed to standard and accomplished 
to support the mission success of higher echelon units. A task that is common to every 
ATKHB METL is to conduct deliberate attacks against massed armored and mechanized 
forces. Therefore, the module portrays attack helicopters used in that primary mission with 
an emphasis on deep attacks. Deep attacks are directed against enemy forces that are not 
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currently engaged but could influence division or corps close operations within the next 24 
to 72 hours (FM1-112, 1991, p. 3-34). Recall that the definition of "deep" for this module 
has been expanded to include all attacks against enemy forces not otherwise engaged by 
ground forces. 
The ATKHB is most effective against massed, moving targets and least effective 
against forces that are in prepared, well-camouflaged positions. Attack battalions cannot 
conduct missions that require the occupation of terrain but they can deny terrain for limited 
periods of time by dominating it with direct and indirect fires. Fire support provided by 
artillery and CAS is important to the survivability of the ATKHB and can be a critical aspect 
of the mission. Fire support suppresses enemy air defenses, causes armored vehicles to 
"button up," and enhances the combat power of the unit (FM1-112, 1991). 
2. The Organization 
The size and organizational structure of an attack helicopter battalion can vary 
depending on the level at which it exists (EAC, corps, or division), the type of attack aircraft 
used or the combat missions it will perform. The basic structure of any ATKHB includes 
subordinate combat and support companies. The attack companies are the combat fighting 
elements containing the attack aircraft, while the support companies consist of all the other 
elements. Support elements usually include an aviation maintenance company and a 
headquarters company with staff sections, a motor maintenance section, mess section, 
communications section, medical treatment section, and a Class IIIN platoon (fuel and 
ammunition). 
3. Deployment for Combat Operations 
Attack battalions deploy personnel and equipment to three general locations on the 
battlefield from which missions are executed and supported: Tactical Assembly Areas (T AA), 
Forward Assembly Areas (FAA), and Forward Arming and Refueling Points (FARPs). The 
bulk of the unit is located in the T AA which is generally located in the support area of the 
major unit parent organization (EAC, corps, or division). The T AA can be considered the 
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main operating base for the ATKHB. The FAA is a battalion position which is normally 
forward in a ground maneuver brigade sector that can be occupied by aircraft and a minimum 
number of support personnel and ground vehicles. F AAs are used for limited periods to 
support specific missions. They are essentially forward staging areas to provide more 
flexibility, reaction time, and range for missions. FARPs are used to support all missions. 
There are two types ofF ARPs; a Main F ARP and a Jump F ARP. The Main F ARP is located 
close to the TAA and is more permanent in nature while the J-FARP is temporary and only 
used for specific missions. The J-FARP is smaller and is packaged with a minimum number 
of fuel and ammunition support vehicles tailored for a specific mission. FARPs are generally 
located as far forward in sector as possible but not within range of enemy artillery. The main 
purpose of the J-FARP is to provide attack aircraft increased range and decrease the time to 
rearm. 
D. ATTACK MISSION PLANNING 
Planning a deliberate attack is an involved process; therefore, a standard planning 
sequence is provided in Department of the Army FM 101-5. In simple terms, planning 
answers the questions: Where will we fight? What is the threat? What missions will we be 
expected to execute? How can we best accomplish those missions? 
A detailed analysis of the specified and implied mission tasks, the threat, intelligence 
information, the terrain, and friendly force operational and logistics capabilities is conducted 
to select the best course of action. The basic elements of an attack plan include: 
• The type of attack to be conducted and desired results. This defines how 
the attacking aircraft will be employed and the desired number of enemy 
vehicles to be destroyed. Desired results are quantified based on accepted 
definitions of terminology used in mission statements and the commanders 
intent. Standard definitions include destroy (at least 70% of the enemy force 
destroyed), attrit (between 30% to 70% of the enemy force destroyed), and 
disrupt (less than 30% of the enemy force destroyed). Table 2.1 lists the 
standard attack employment methods. 
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TYPE OF ATTACK DESCRIPTION 
Constant pressure is maintained on the enemy force by rotating attack companies so 
Continuous at least one company remains in the battle. Given three attack companies, one is 
attacking, one is en route, and one is in the FARP. This method provides sustained 
fires over long periods of time. 
A modification of the continuous attack. One company may begin the attack but the 
Phased second company is quickly phased into the attack. The third company can be phased 
into the fight when one of the other companies is low on fuel or ammunition. This 
method is used to increase the initial firepower of an attack or to save firepower for 
exploitation. 
Maximum Destruction All attack companies are used simultaneously to overwhelm the enemy with massed 
fires. 
Table 2.1 Attack Employment Methods. [FM 1-112, 1991, pp. 3-12 to 3-14]. 
• The force size (number of attack aircraft) and appropriate weapons load 
required to accomplish the mission. The force size is determined by the 
number of aircraft required to destroy a specific number of enemy vehicles. 
Planners usually determine that number based on the number of point target 
munitions carried per aircraft along with a very conservative probability of a 
kill. 
• Engagement Area (EA) location in which to kill the enemy targets. BAs are 
based on known and forecasted enemy locations and possible movement given 
the most likely avenues of approach. 
• Battle Position locations (BPs) which provide the best observation and 
fields· of fire based on terrain, weapon systems, and time of day 
considerations. BPs are placed to provide flexibility, survivability, and 
mutually supporting fires. The distance from the target area is far enough to 
take advantage of weapon standoff ranges but close enough to allow for 
target identification. There are generally several designated primary and 
alternate BPs. 
• Attack Routes for ingress and egress to the BPs. The routes are selected 
to maximize aircraft survivability. They are determined based on the friendly 
scheme of maneuver and the perceived enemy threat. The known or 
suspected enemy ADA sites are avoided when possible. Terrain is also used 
to mask and conceal movement. 
• F AAs, Jump F ARP, and holding area (HA) locations are designated. F AAs 
and F ARPs have already been discussed. Holding areas are temporary 
locations that can be used for short periods ( 1 0-15 minutes) of time, primarily 
for coordination. A flight of attack helicopters may set down in a HA to wait 
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for refuel at a F ARP which is occupied by another flight group or to receive 
final instructions before occupying a BP. 
• Directives for mission readiness cycle and crew rest plan. The unit is placed 
on a work/crew rest cycle to support the mission based on the time of day the 
attack is to be executed. Most ATKHBs plan to support continuous 
operations but are most effective at night and must be able to support those 
operations; an enforced readiness cycle makes that possible. 
E. ATTACKMISSIONEXECUTION 
The mission is executed in accordance with an established set of rules known as 
Tactical Standard Operating Procedures (TACSOP) supplemented by specific mission orders. 
Execution may differ slightly from unit to unit but some of the most common practices are 
addressed below. 
1. Actions at the Objective 
Actions taken at the objective involve conduct in and around the BPs and Engagement 
Area; they are the actions that directly affect the targeting and engagement of enemy forces. 
The main consideration at the objective is fire control. Fire control is critical to mission 
accomplishment and allows the commander to direct fires at selected targets and maximize 
the number of targets destroyed. Fire control consists of the fire distribution plan, 
engagement priorities, and target priorities. 
Fire distribution is controlled at the battalion, company, and platoon levels and 
defines how the unit will engage the enemy. The attack helicopter battalion uses BPs, 
company sectors, EAs, and target reference points to deconflict fires. Figure 2.1 illustrates 
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Figure 2.1 ATKHB Fire Distribution. Fires are coordinated 
with three company BPs and designated sectors within the battalion 
engagement area. The sectors for fire are separated by phase lines (AB 
and BC) and each has a target reference point (TRP) to mark the center 
aiming point. 
Engagement and target priorities are also used to control the unit fires. Engagement 
priorities concerns the actions of the individual flight crew during the mission. The general 
rule is to engage the nearest target that first poses a threat. Target priorities are mission 
dependent and refer to the types of targets that should receive priority for destruction. 
(FM1-112, 1991, pp. 3-14, 3-19) 
EXAMPLE 2.1: Typical target priorities for an ATKHB. 




2. Actions En Route 
Attack helicopter units maneuver in much the same way as ground combat forces 
except the terrain does not hinder movement. The helicopter force uses terrain along with 
appropriate flight modes and techniques of movement to maintain security while en route to 
and from an objective. Flight modes include low-level, contour, and Nap-of-the Earth 
(NOB). Low-level and contour flight are at higher airspeeds but differ in the altitudes used. 
Low-level flight is conducted at an steady altitude which allows for terrain and obstacle 
clearance (the aircraft maintain a consistent above sea-level, ASL, altitude). Contour flight 
is conducted with changing altitudes based on the contour of the land (the aircraft follow the 
contour while maintaining a consistent above ground-level, AGL, altitude). NOEflight is 
maneuver at hovering speeds (generally less than 3 5 knots) and is as close to terrain and 
obstacles as safety allows. 
There are three movement techniques: traveling, traveling overwatch, and bounding 
overwatch. Traveling is used when speed is important and threat contact is not likely. All 
aircraft travel at a constant airspeed. Traveling overwatch is used when speed is still 
important but threat contact is likely. Part of the flight travels at a consistent airspeed while 
the rest travel at necessary speeds to provide overwatch, covering key terrain that may be 
occupied by the enemy. Bounding overwatch is used when threat contact is expected and 
speed is not as important as survival. The aircraft elements leap-frog in a manner so that one 
element, the overwatch element, is in a cover and concealed position to monitor the progress 
ofthe bounding element.· (FM1-112, 1991, pp. 4-6 and 4-7) 
F. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 
Service support of attack helicopter operations is a demanding task that requires 
extensive planning and coordination. Every attack unit has the capacity to stock a certain 
level of supplies but that capacity is limited and supplies are consumed quickly during combat 
operations. Unlike other maneuver forces, the ATKHB can be tactically employed anywhere 
within the division's or corps' area of operations. Therefore, the ATKHB depends on CSS 
from its parent aviation brigade and the division and corps support commands. Attack 
15 
helicopters will require fuel and ammunition resupply every 1 Y2 to 2 hours and maintenance 
requirements will depend on the operational tempo (the number and duration of missions for 
a given cycle). Successful mission support depends on how well the three critical classes of 
supply are integrated into the tactical plan. These critical classes are fuel, ammunition, and 
maintenance repair parts. (FMI-112, 1991, pp. 6-1 to 6-2) 
Fuel requirements are determined by daily and mission needs. Daily needs are 
determined by multiplying the estimated daily hours each type of aircraft will fly by the 
consumption rate of the aircraft. That figure is then multiplied by the total number of that 
aircraft type in the unit. The daily fuel quantity required is the sum of the totals by aircraft 
type. Mission needs are determined the same way, however, mission available aircraft totals 
are used. Mission needs are used primarily to determine F ARP and J-F ARP requirements and 
to modify daily estimates. 
Fuel is generally throughput with corps tankers and delivered to divisional support 
battalion fuel depots. ATKHB fuel tankers then pick up fuel from designated support 
battalion fuel depots within the division support area. (FM1-112, 1991, p. 6-3) 
Ammunition needs are determined in much the same way. A daily estimate is 
determined or directed based on forecasted missions. Specific mission requirements are then 
used to update daily estimates. Ammunition is issued from Ammunition Transfer Points 
(ATPs) within each echelon of command: theater, corps and division. (FM1-112, 1991, pp. 
6-4 to 6-5) 
Maintenance repair parts requirements are determined from aircraft hours flown. 
There are parts that are routinely required and forecasted and parts that are not planned and 
unforecasted. The operational tempo of the unit determines the repair rate and type of 
required repair parts, but this is also influenced by the availability of maintenance personnel. 
Depending on the level of maintenance required (unit, intermediate, or depot level), an 
aircraft may be evacuated to another (higher echelon maintenance) unit for repair. 
Attack helicopter units plan and execute missions based on the number of Mission 
Capable (MC) aircraft. The aircraft that are Not Mission Capable (NMC) are in some 
maintenance status that precludes there use during a mission. Some of the NMC aircraft are 
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in planned or routine maintenance while others are in maintenance for repair. Every unit has 
maintenance standards. An AH-64 equipped attack battalion, for example, maintains an 85% 
MC aircraft availability rate. Proper repair parts planning and forecasting can support the 
established maintenance standard, even with unexpected maintenance problems. 
G. MISSION READINESS CYCLES 
Mission readiness cycles are important because they have an impact on the operational 
tempo of the unit. The mission readiness cycle refers to the 24 hour cycle that the unit 
maintains to support forecasted missions. The 24 hour or daily cycle is subdivided into 
different periods which are defined by readiness conditions. This allows the battalion to rest 
and perform maintenance while supporting projected mission times (FM1-112, 1991, p. 2-














More than 2 Hours (Crews in Rest Cycle) 
Table 2.2 Aircrew Readiness Levels. 
[FM 1-112, 1991, p. 2-16] 
Attack helicopter units must plan to support continuous, 24 hour, combat operations. 
Continuous planning is possible but it is impossible for a given battalion to execute attack 
missions around the clock. The entire battalion may be at the same readiness level or 
companies may be at different levels depending on the projected missions. In general, most 
attack helicopter units are on a cycle to support day ornight missions and can be expected 
to conduct a finite number of missions for a given day and/or night period. Most attack 
missions are conducted at night to increase the survivability of the aircraft. The cycle may 
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also depend on the attack aircraft type. An AH-64 equipped battalion is better suited for 
night operations than an AH-lF battalion, for example. 
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III. MODELING ATTACK HELICOPTER OPERATIONS 
The modeling formulations in this chapter represent attack helicopter deliberate 
attacks against targeted units not in contact with other ground forces. The primary role of 
an attack helicopter unit is to conduct deliberate attacks against hostile armor and mechanized 
forces. Therefore, that is the mission focus of this thesis. 
The underlying assumption that an attack mission is generated, assigned to a specific 
attack helicopter unit, and has appropriate target information is a necessary foundation for 
this thesis work. The issues involved in targeting logic and mission generation are beyond the 
scope of this thesis but are briefly discussed later in this chapter. 
The major events that occur in the conduct of an attack helicopter mission are 
addressed in the sequential order depicted in Figure 3 .1. Modeling formulations are 
presented followed by simple numerical examples using opposing force structures as 
described in Chapter I. 
MSN ASSIGNED 
TO A TK HEL UNIT 
(TGTDATA INPUT) 




EN ROU1E ATIRITION 
ASSESSED 
ATK UNIT OCCUPIES 
BA TILE POSffiON 
OBI AREAATIRITION 
ASSESSED 
ENGAGEMENT ENDS & 
EGRESSFLTPATII 
DETERMINED 
EN ROU1E A TIRITION 
ASSESSED 
Figure 3.1 Deliberate Attack Mission Flow. This flow chart illustrates the 
major event sequence in the conduct of an attack helicopter deliberate attack mission. 
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A. UNITREPRESENTATION 
The attack helicopter unit can be represented using two entities, one for all the 
support elements, and the other for the attack aircraft. The support elements are not 
explicitly modeled but are considered to exist at a location, such as the tactical assembly area 
or base within the parent unit's support area. The attack aircraft entity is explicitly modeled 
to provide a means for the attack helicopters to move as an independent unit. 
The attack helicopter unit is defined by a unit data file that contains user defined 
parameters. The base unit data file contains single entries and references to supporting data 
files of information. Unit data file parameters include the type of information that is depicted 
in Table 3 .1. The xxx. dat entries highlighted in bold lettering are supporting data files with 
additional information relevant to that entry. Tables 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 show examples of 
supporting data files for the type of attack aircraft, a specific mission type, and the base data 
file. 
The parameters and values in the data files are based on information that can be found 
in Department of the Army FM 1-112, Attack Helicopter Battalion, 1991, and estimations 
based on the authors familiarity with current attack helicopter operations and knowledge of 
the topic. Further explanations of parameter definitions and uses will be addressed in 
subsequent sections as they are used in modeling formulations. 
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Unit.dat file 
Data Definition Example 
side blue or red blue 
class id of unit icon class Attack Helo Aviation 
size id of unit size (BN, BDE, etc .. ) BN 
unit id of unit 1-24 Attack Bn 
parent unit id of higher headquarters unit 24ID AvnBde 
planning cycle planning cycle for missions in hours 12 hrs 
day missions avg number of daylight msn' s per 24 hr pd 1 
night missions avgnurnber of night msn's per 24 hrpd 2 
base id of base or tactical assembly area ViperBase.dat 
aircraft id and quantity of attack aircraft AH64.dat I 24 
msn priority msn type I relative mission priority DelAttack.dat I 1 00 
note: This is similar to the way priorities are Hasty Atk.dat I 80 
established for fixed-wing missions in the Recon.dat I 20 
JWAEP Ver. 2.0 User Documentation, 1996, Security.dat I 10 page 14. 
AirCombat.dat I 5 
Table 3.1 Attack Helicopter Unit Data. 
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L_ _______________________________________________________________________________________ _ 
AH64.datfile 
Data Definition Example 
speed average mission speed (km per hr) 200kmperhr 
range max range of aircraft in km 400km 
res radar cross section measured 20 deg of 4.0 m 2 (estimate) 
the nose (sqr meters) 
Pfmc avg % time fully mission capable 0.85 
maint failure avg maintenance failure rate during a 0.05 
mission 
fuel burn rate avg mission fuel burn rate (gal per hr) 142 gal per hr 
jammer effect jammer effect factor; dimensionless 20 
factor based on jammer noise in db 
Example: if jammer noise level = 13 db, then 
L= lOx (x= 13db+ 10) 
munitions munition Hellfire I P I 7.5 km 
I type {A= area, P= point fue} 70mm RKT I A I 9 km 
I max range in km 30mml Al3 km 
heavy msn load munition type I quantity Hellfue I 16 
70mml0 
30mml 1200 
light msn load munition type I quantity Hellfuel08 
70mml38 
30mml 1200 
estPK estimated avg PK for missiles (used for 0.60 
msn force size planning) 
timetofue avg time in seconds to acquire a target 8 sees 
and fire a point fue munition 
Table 3.2 Attack Helicopter Aircraft Data. 
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De!Attack.dat file 
Data Definition Example 
Psuccess K- Destroy (70%), K=0.70 
A- attrit (50%), or 
D- delay (30%) 
wpnsload target type unit I weapons load armor I heavy 
mech/heavy 
motorized I light 
infantry I light 
unknown I light 
hvy wpns load munition type I quantity Hellfrre I 16 
70mm/O 
30mm/ 1200 
light msn load munition type I quantity Hellfrre I 8 
70mm/38 
30mm/ 1200 
Pabort abort criteria (abort msn if 0.50 
losses :? A (OJ x (1-pabort) 
where A(O) is the start msn force 
size. 
eng cycle defines the avg engagement cycle E/U/15/5 
activity E - eng tgts, MV - mvmt MV /M/25/10 
IM- masked, U- unmasked 
I avg time seconds 
I std deviation in seconds 
BPrange condition D- day, N- night D/6 
I avg BP to target range in km N/4 
fire control amount of fire control p 
R - random, or P - perfect 




Motorized I 5 
Table 3.3 Attack Mission Data 
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ViperBase.dat file 
CSS parent unit id of parent combat service support organization 24ASB 
class III aircraft POL type JP4/12500 gal 
I daily basic load capacity in gallons MOGAS /2500 gal 
Diesel/ 2500 gal 
class V armnotype Hellfire /384 
I daily basic load capacity in rounds 70mmRKT /1824 
30mm/28800 
gndequip gnd support vehicles I qty Ml009/6 
ll ton HEMAT /15 
fork lift /2 
2500 gal tanker /7 
cargo HEMA T /8 
5/4 ton commo trk /13 
M1008/2 
etc ... 
re-supply cycle re-supply cycle for forecasts in hours 12 hrs 
Table 3.4 Attack Helicopter Base Data. 
B. UNIT MOVEMENT 
The attack helicopter battalion can conduct two types of movement, an administrative 
movement or tactical road march to reposition the entire unit to a new tactical assembly area 
or a combat movement to attack a specific target. If the battalion is conducting an 
administrative or tactical move to a new location (all aircraft and ground support vehicles) 
then it can move with the parent unit. There is no need to portray independent movement in 
this case. 
Attack helicopters are required to move independently if they are given a mission. 
Therefore, the attack helicopters are the only ATKHB aircraft or vehicles that are explicitly 
portrayed when moving in the simulation. The ground support vehicles are implicitly moved 
with the parent unit but the need to explicitly move certain support vehicles may arise with 
future JW AEP enhancements. For example, if the logistics module is enhanced to portray the 
transfer of fuel and ammunition from supply depots to forward units, the ATKHB F ARP fuel 
and ammunition vehicles should be portrayed explicitly. 
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Explicit movement of helicopter forces can be conducted on a user defined network 
of nodes and arcs as described in the JWAEP Version 2. 0 User Documentation (Youngren 
and Lovell, 1996). The network should represent the major helicopter air avenues of 
approach in the theater of operations. The helicopter air avenue network is a superset of the 
ground network (the helicopter network contains the entire ground network and possible 
additional "air only" arcs and nodes). Air avenues of approach for helicopters are similar to 
ground vehicle avenues of approach but less restrictive. They generally follow the lower 
elevations and contours where the use of terrain masking can be maximized to provide cover 
and concealment and the need to make en route altitude adjustments is minimized. 
A network "shortest path" algorithm is used to define a flight path from the helicopter 
tactical assembly area or base to the intended target location. The algorithm selects the flight 
path that minimizes the total risk or cost from the base to the designated target node that does 
not exceed the flights maximum combat range. The same procedure is executed following 
an attack to determine the egress flight path from the BP at the target area back to the base. 
The total risk for a given flight path is the sum of the cost for each path segment. A 
flight path segment is an arc or a node with an associated distance. The path segment cost 
is the sum of the weighted arc distance and the weighted ADA threat level. The arc distances 
and threat levels are weighted to portray relative priority in determining the path. The same 
principle is used in Hua-Chung Wang's Master's Thesis, Development and Implementation 
of Air Module Algorithms for the Future Theater Level Model, March 1994. The algorithm 
is in the form of a modified label-correcting algorithm with a worst case complexity of O(JNI 
lAD using Big-0 notation (Ahuja, et. al., 1993, p. 140). 
The label-correcting algorithm assumes a directed network is used with positive arc 
lengths and risk levels, however, the algorithm works for both directed and undirected 
networks. A predecessor index is used to define a predecessor graph. The predecessor graph 
will contain a unique directed path from the source node, S, to every node k that is within the 
combat range of the flight and has the lowest level of risk. If an optimal path exists that is 
within the combat range of the flight, it can be easily determined from the predecessor graph. 
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The complete algorithm is shown in Appendix A, Network Shortest Path Algorithm, 
and the following parameters are used: 
• Algorithm Input: 
G = (N, A) {the network in linked node, forward star (FS) arc adjacency list} 
S {the starting node} 
T {the ending node} 
R {combat range of the attack helicopter unit - Y2 of the total mission range} 
dij {distance from node i to node j in kilometers} 
w d {weight or relative importance of distance} 
w1 {weight or relative importance of threat where (wa+ W1 = 1.0)} 
tij {perceived ADA threat level from node ito} on a scale ofO to 1, 1 being the 
highest threat} 
• Variables: 
TD(i) = L dij 
(i,;) E Pred List 
{total distance at node i based on the optimal path 
from the predecessor list} 
TR(i) L {total risk at node i based on the optimal path} 
(i,J) E Pred List 
riJ 
{arc (i,j) cost} 
Note: The calculation for cost is based on weighted values for arc distance and threat 
level. The distance is normalized for combat rangeR to give it the same relative order 





{the path from the predecessor list} 
{total dist from S to T based on optimal path} 
{total ADA risk from S to T based on optimal path} 
The label-correcting algorithm is written in a form that assumes all network nodes 
have no associated distance or risk level. If a given node i has an associated distance (d), it 
can be split into two nodes, i 1 and i ~~ The resulting arc (i', i") can now be assigned the 
values associated with node i. Figure 3.2 illustrates an example of node splitting. (Ahuja, et. 
al., 1993, p. 41) 
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1 Original Network 
dl'l .=5 d1"2=12 
ri'I"=I.O 
o--o 





Figure 3.2 Network Conversion. The technique of node 
splitting is used on nodes with associated areas. Node 2 in the 
diagram is only a connector node with no associated area and did 
not need to be split. 
The threat level for a given segment in the network is calculated using the same basic 
form as described in Hua-Chung Wang's Master's Thesis, Development and Implementation 
of Air Module Algorithms for the Future Theater Level Model, 1994. The threat level for 
each arc, tij, is the proportion of area that is covered by the sum of lethal ADA weapon 
system areas on a given arc or node. The equation used is 
_ . {~ (PKk x AREAk) } 
t .. - mm , 1.0 
IJ AREA .. 
I] 
(1) 
where AREA.. = { length x width for arcs 
IJ 11: (node radius)2 for nodes 
PKk = estimated probability of kill for ADA weapon k, and 
AREA = {(ADA range) x (arc width) for arcs 
k 11: (ADA range? for nodes 
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The calculations for AREAk , the ADA weapon k area coverage, are based on the 
assumption the weapons are located at the center point of the node or associated arc - this 
provides for maximum ADA coverage which is the most conservative estimate. The 
calculation for area coverage on an arc uses a simplified rectangular approximation to the 
actual area that would be covered based on a circular coverage area. 
The ADA area is weighted by its estimated probability of kill, PKk> for the given ADA 
weapon type k against any target of interest. The probability used is only a planning factor 
based on the perceived capabilities of the weapon. The true probability of kill (a different 
value from the estimated PKk) based on the ADA weapon type, aircraft type, and ammunition 
used, will be used for actual attrition during a mission. (Wang, 1994, p. 8) 
EXAMPLE 3.1: Threat Level. Given a threat SA-13 ADA weapon system with an estimated 
pk of 0.60 and a range of 8 km, calculate the threat level if it is located on an (a) node with 
radius = 15 km, and (b) arc with length = 20 km and width = 5 km. 
(a)forthe node: AREAnode = n(15kmf = 706.86km 2 
AREA5M = n(8kmf = 201.06km 2 
threatlevel(t ) = (estPK=0.6) x (201.06) = 0.17 
node 706.86 
(b)forthe arc: AREAarc = (20km) x (5km) = 100km 2 
AREA sAP on arc = (ADA mg = 8 km) x (arc width = 5 km) = 40 km 2 
threat level (t ) = (estPK = 0·6> x <40> = 0.24 
arc 100 
C. MISSION FORCE SIZE 
The mission force size is calculated at the start of every new mission. It is based on 
the number of attack helicopters in the unit, current unit maintenance posture, the perceived 
number of vehicles in the targeted enemy force, the weapons load for the mission type and 
target category, and the mission success criteria. The number of aircraft at the start of the 
mission will be limited to the minimum number of aircraft required to destroy the specified 
number of enemy vehicles subject to aircraft availability. Therefore, the total battalion force 
size for a mission is determined without regard to subordinate company size formations 
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within the battalion. It is assumed that subordinate company units will be task organized 
accordingly. 
The number of mission aircraft, A(O), is determined by 
A(O) = min { Areq, AFMC }· (2) 
The available number of aircraft, A FMc, is the rounded down integer value of the 
number of aircraft type a available multiplied by the user defined fully mission capable (FMC) 
maintenance rate: 
AFMc= l (TOT A/C) x (%FMC) j (3) 
The required number of aircraft, Areq , is calculated based on the perceived number of 
enemy combat vehicles, the mission success criteria as defined for the type mission (destroy, 
attrit, or delay), and the aircraft weapons load (heavy or light). It is assumed the targets 
assigned to a given attack battalion are realistic. The target size, in terms of the number of 
targeted vehicles, should not exceed the capabilities of the attack battalion. Ifthe target is 
much larger than the attack battalion's capabilities ( Areq >>A FMc), more than one attack 
battalion should be assigned the mission. An alternative method would be to have the attack 
battalion execute two attacks on the target. However, it would be unreasonable to have an 
attack battalion execute more than two back to back attacks on the same target. 
The weapons load is based on the target category and the type of mission performed. 
There is a trade off between area fire munitions like rockets and 30mm rounds that are used 
more for suppression against lightly armored vehicles and point fire munitions like Hellfire 
missiles that are used to kill heavily armored vehicles like tanks. For example, if the target 
is a heavily armored tank regiment and the mission is a deliberate attack, the weapons load 
would be heavy; i.e., maximum point fire munitions are carried. A light load is typically a 
mix of point fire and area fire munitions and is more appropriate for attacks against lightly 
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armored forces or in cases where the threat situation is not clear.* The aircraft weapons load 
and specific munitions configuration is based on the target description and aircraft type as 
depicted in Table 3.2, Section A 
Calculations for the number of aircraft required are based only on the number of point 
fire munitions carried per aircraft. Therefore, the required number of aircraft is 
Areq 






where Areq is rounded up to the nearest integer value and 
Tot Veh =total enemy vehicles (based on perceived information), 




= number of point fire munitions per aircraft type a based on weapons load, 
= estimated probability a missile hits and kills a given target. 
All the parameters above, except for the number of targeted enemy vehicles, are from 
the appropriate attack helicopter or mission type data files. 
* In the context of JW AEP, which maintains an explicit probability list for every possible unit set at a node or arc, it will be 
necessary to develop rules that specify the dominant target type(s) (e.g., those with a cumulative probability of 75%) and 
determine the mission load based on them. 
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EXAMPLE 3.2: Mission Force Size. The mission is to destroy an enemy tank regiment with 
135 combat vehicles. Each attack helicopter (AH-64) is armed with sixteen hellfire missiles 
(heavy load based on Armored unit target). 
STEP 1: Determine number of aircraft available for mission. 
Eqn (3) AFMc = (24 AH-64's) x (% FMC = .85) = 20.4 :. 20 aircraft 
STEP 2: Determine number of aircraft required to destroy 70% of the vehicles. 
Eqn (4) A. _ (135 vehs) x (%SUCCESS· .70) = 9_84375 
eq (16 HellfiresperAIC,) x (EstPK0 • .60) 
:. 10 aircraft 
STEP 3: Determine number of aircraft for the mission. 
Eqn (2) A(O) = min { AFMc = 20 , A.eq = 1 0 } :. A(O) = 1 0 aircraft 
Note: Assumes each aircraft has the opportunity to fire all missiles and fire distribution between 
each aircraft is perfectly coordinated. The estimated P{kill} = .60 is an accepted planning value 
thatiscommonlyusedforAH-64's. (FM1-112, 1991, p. C-19) 
The mission abort criteria is calculated once the mission force size is determined. The 
abort criteria defines the minimwn nwnber of aircraft required for the mission. If at any time 
during the mission the nwnber of aircraft in the flight becomes less than or equal to the abort 
criteria the mission is stopped at that point and the flight returns to base. The abort criteria 
is calculated as ABORT = A(O) x %Abort, where %Abort is a user defined parameter for 
the unit and mission type. Each attrition adjudication, except for an egressing flight, is 
followed by a mission abort check to determine if the attack helicopter mission continues. 
If A(!)> A(O) x %Abort, then the mission continues. 
If A(!) 5 A(O) x %Abort, then the mission is ended and the flight returns to its base. 
A flight that reaches its abort criteria while traveling en route to the target area will 
return to base along the same flight path. An attack helicopter force reaching its abort criteria 
while occupying a battle position returns to base along a new path as determined using the 
flight path algorithm to minimize the threat and distance traveled. 
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D. ATTRITION ADJUDICATION 
There are three types of attrition that are addressed for modeling purposes. One is 
maintenance related and the other two are due to hostile forces. All involve the loss of 
mission aircraft but maintenance losses are temporary subject to repairs while losses due to 
hostile fire are permanent. The hostile attrition process is simplified by limiting the possible 
engagements between the attack helicopter force and hostile forces. Engagements or force 
interactions are a function of the attack helicopter force disposition (traveling en route or at 
the objective area in fixed battle positions), munitions carried, the mission, and the type of 
opposing force. 
1. Maintenance Failure Attrition 
Maintenance failure or non-hostile attrition is assessed at the start of every mission. 
It represents the number of aircraft that may be lost during the mission due to some 
maintenance related problem. A one time adjudication takes place at the start of each 
mission. A random draw from a binomial distribution is used to determine maintenance losses 
based on a given input parameter, Pmainta; the probability that aircraft type a is lost due to 
maintenance during the mission (aircraft in maintenance before the mission are accounted for 
in A FMc). Recall that A(O) is the force size at the start of the mission. 
Let X~ Binomial( n=A(O), p = PmaintaJ ; then A(O) = A(O) -X 
The maintenance losses, X, are all assumed to be repairable and/or recoverable and 
are therefore only deleted from the current mission. They are considered to be available for 
subsequent missions. 
32 
2. En Route Attrition 
En route attrition is defined as the destruction of traveling attack helicopters by hostile 
forces. Hostile air defense weapon systems are the major threat but threat fixed wing air and 
attack helicopters conducting air-to-air combat missions can also cause attrition. The attrition 
is one sided with respect to hostile ADA - only the ADA weapons fire at aircraft. 
Attack helicopters only engage targets with offensive fires from fixed battle positions. 
Any en route fires are assumed to be defensive and primarily suppressive in nature having 
negligible effects on the enemy. Therefore, suppressive fires against ground targets en route 
are not considered for modeling purposes. The only exceptions are defensive fires against 
hostile attacking air forces (fixed wing or helicopters). Figure 3.3 portrays the forces which 
can interact during the en route phase. 
En route attrition is adjudicated sequentially with air to air engagements following 
surface to air engagements. It is assumed that surface to air engagements are most likely to 
occur first and air to air engagements will not occur at the same time as surface to air 
engagements. 
-- Red Ground Force Organic ADA 
~ .. ft Red Ground Forces 
Figure 3.3 Possible En Route Attrition Interaction. The thick 
arrows indicate the enemy force type the attack helicopter writ can engage 




a. Surface to Air 
An ingressing or egressing attack helicopter force follows an air axis of 
advance on designated routes. Most air axes contain multiple air routes. Helicopters fly at 
relatively slow airspeeds (between 35 and 120 nautical miles per hour) and at altitudes 
typically below 200 feet above ground level. The slow speed of the aircraft may be 
advantageous for the ADA unit but the low altitude and increased maneuverability of the 
helicopter make it a difficult target to acquire and engage. Terrain masking can also limit the 
ability of the ADA unit to fire at the aircraft. Figure 3.4 illustrates an example of an air axis 
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Figure 3.4 Air Routes thru an ADA Lethal Range Fan. The 
Air Axis with two air routes passes through the lethal range (aircraft can be 
acquired and engaged) of a hostile ADA unit. The terrain as depicted will 
provide some masking oflow flying aircraft which limits the time the ADA 
unit can acquire and engage targets. 
Another factor that can have a limiting effect on the abilities of the ADA unit 
is onboard aircraft survivability equipment. Many helicopters have electronic radar jammers, 
chaff, and other devices to combat threat radars and missiles. 
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The en route attrition adjudication calculation for ADA systems versus a flight 
of attack helicopters takes place once for each arc and node along a designated flight path if 
that segment ofthe air axis crosses the lethal range of an ADA weapon system. The attrition 
calculation accounts for the entire time the aircraft in the flight are within the lethal range. 
Therefore, if the lethal range of an ADA system covers more than one arc or node on the 
selected flight path then attrition is only calculated once. 
The lethal range of an ADA weapon system is defined as the minimum of the 
adjusted fire-control radar range and the maximum slant range for the missile fired. The 
acquisition radar range for the given ADA weapon system is not considered in determining 
the lethal range. It is assumed the probability of a given acquisition radar's ability to detect 
and track a low level flight of helicopters beyond the range of the fire-control radar is 
sufficiently low enough to be considered insignificant. 
The adjudication process involves (1) calculating the adjusted fire-control 
radar range and determining the lethal range of the ADA system, (2) determining the total 
engagement time, (3) calculating the possible number of shots the ADA weapon makes, and 
( 4) calculating the number of aircraft destroyed in the flight. 
Step 1- Lethal Range. The lethal range is defined as the range at which a given ADA 
weapon system and its associated fire-control radar system can engage a target and is 
determined based on: 
(5) 
where RFc = adjusted fire-control radar range, and 
RMsL = the maximum slant range for the ADA missile fired. 
The adjusted fire-control radar range is dependent on the characteristics of the 
radar system and the target. The basic range equation as described by Gershon J. Wheeler 




= max range at which target is detectable 
= radar power 
= radar frequency 
= effective area of the radar receiving antenna 
= radar cross sectional area of the target (RCS) 
= minimum detectable signal 
= system signal loss factor. 
If the basic radar equation is modified so Rmax = C (-L0 \V. , where C = ( P, A; ) y., 
J 41t >..2 smin 
it follows that R ex (~ \'!. . 
. max L} 
The above proportional relationship is used to determine the adjusted fire-
control radar range, ~c. The calculations are based on the radar cross sectional area of the 
entire flight of aircraft, oFLT> and the signal loss factor for the flight due to the effects of 
jammers, UFLT· 
There are many sources of loss in a system that reduce the transmitted and 
received signals. The system loss is the sum of all losses and is a number greater than the 
unity equivalent to the system loss in decibels. For example, if the system loss is 13db, the 
loss factor is 20 (10 log 20 = 13). The type ofloss attributed to the effects of jammers is 
called a collapsing loss. Jammers produce noise that can effectively mask certain signals by 
reducing the signal-to-noise ratio which reduces receiver sensitivity. The loss due to that 
degradation is an example of a collapsing loss. (Wheeler, 1967, pp.32,33) 
where 
The adjusted fire-control radar range is calculated using the formula: 
n 
0nr = L 0 i' 




R)c = max range of radar system against a target with RCS equal to one ( a1 = 1 m2) 
n = total number of aircraft 
Of = the RCS for ith aircraft 
Li = signal loss due to the ith aircraft jammer. 
The form of the equation for L!FLr was adopted from Air Force Studies and 
Analyses Agency, Thunder Analyst's Manual, May 1994, page 12-97, and is analogous to 
E0 in Equation 12-7 in the manual. 
Step 2- Engagement Time. The ADA engagement time, TE, represents the average 
length of time that the ADA weapon can actively fire at the flight. It is calculated based on 






TE = (PLOS X T) - (TD + TR) 
=total time within the ADA lethal range 
= time it takes to detect the flight 
= time it takes the weapon to get ready or prepare to fire, and 
(7) 
= probability that line of sight exists between the ADA weapon and the 
flight. 
Assuming the lethal area around an ADA weapon system can be approximated 
by a circle and given the lethal range, RL , a random draw from a uniform distribution, X -
U(O, RL ), is used to determine the point at which the aircraft penetrates the circular lethal 
area. The total time within the area T = d I S where the distance traveled within area 
d = 2 J RL2 - x 2 and S =the aircraft average combat speed. A graphical illustration is 
shown in Figure 3. 5 that depicts the geometry used to calculate the distance d. 
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Figure 3. 5 Flight Travel Distance Within ADA Lethal 
Range. The distance, d, which an ATKHB flight travels within the ADA 
lethal range is calculated using simple geometry where d = 2 J RL2 - x 2 • 
The detection time is determined using a random draw from an exponential 
distribution where TD ~ Exp (A.) and the rate is a user defined input for the given ADA 
system. The ready time or time it takes the ADA weapon to prepare to fire, TR, is also a 
user defined parameter based on the average time for the specific system. Obviously, if the 
sum of the detection time and the ready time is greater than the adjusted total time, the 
engagement time equals zero. 
If (TD + TR) > (T x PLOS) then TE = 0. 
Terrain masking is accounted for by using PLOS, the probability that line of 
sight exists between the weapon and intended target. PLOS is a function of the terrain type 
and the range to target. Studies conducted for the U.S. Army indicate the PLOS can be 
approximated using the Weibull distribution with parameters a and ~ that vary based on the 
terrain type. (Military OR Analyst's Handbook, 1994, p. 2-24) 
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Step 3 - Number of Shots. The total number of shots, Nshots, the ADA weapon can fire 
in the given period of time, IE, is calculated based on the specified ADA weapon system rate 
of fire, and the total number of missiles available, Ntot: 
Nshots = min { [(Weapon Rate of Fire) x TE], Ntot} (8) 
The total number of missiles available, Ntot, is defined as the number of missiles on the 
launcher that are ready to fire and the number of missiles that are ready for immediate reload. 
It is assumed that the weapon rate of fire takes into account the reload time for missiles that 
are not on the launcher ready to fire. 
Step 4 - Number of Kills. The final step is to determine the number of aircraft that are 
destroyed by the ADA system. A random binomial draw based on the number of missiles 
fired and the probability an individual aircraft is killed by a single missile, SSPK, is used to 
determine losses when the number of missiles fired is less than or equal to the number of 
aircraft, Nshots ~ A(i). It is assumed that each missile is fired at a different aircraft. 
Let L(i) -Binomial (n = Nshots, p = SSPK); then L(i) =aircraft losses 
The single shot probability of a kill, SSPK, is the probability an individual aircraft is killed by 
one shot from the ADA weapon. The SSPKk-a value is a user defined parameter for the 
specified ADA weapon type k firing against aircraft type a. (Thunder, 1994, p. 12-95) 
If the number of missiles fired is greater than the number of aircraft, Nshots 
> A(l), then the number of missiles fired at each aircraft is distributed as evenly as possible. 
The minimum number of missiles allocated per aircraft is calculated as Nmin = l Nshors J· 
A(i) 
Nmin is then allocated to each aircraft. The remaining missiles, if any, are distributed one per 
aircraft until all are allocated. For example, if 10 missiles are fired at 7 aircraft, then Nmin 
= 1 and missiles are allocated as follows: 
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Aircraft 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Initial missile allocation (Nmin each) 
Remaining missile allocation 
Total Missiles 2 2 2 
The number of kills is then calculated based on a Bernoulli trial for each 
missile fired. The losses for the current flight path segment i are determined by: 
A(i) 






w ere . = 
J 0 otherwise (9) 
The number of aircraft that start the next, i+ 1, segment is calculated by 
subtracting losses from the number of aircraft at the start of the current path segment: 
A(i+ I) = A(i) - L(i). (IO) 
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EXAMPLE 3.3: Surface to Air Attrition. Determine the number of aircraft losses given a flight 
of 10AH-64 each with aRCS= 4.0 m2 and a jammer with an effective rating of 20, and a SA-9 
ADA weapon system with 4 missiles available, a rate of fire of 1 missile every 5 sees, missile 
range 8 km, fire-control range 10 km and an acquisition rate).. = .03 min·1, and crew ready time 
approximately 8 seconds. The estimated PLOS for the terrain is .05. 
STEP 1: Determine lethal range. 
10 
RCSforflight oFLr=L4.0m 2 =40m 2 
and flight signal loss du~t~ jaTmers LJFLT = c~1 202) ~ = 63.25 
Eqn (6) RFc = (1 0 km) (~)4 = 8.9 km , 
63.25 
therefore Eqn (5) RL = min { 8.9 km, 8 km} = 8 km 
STEP 2: Determine the engagement time. 
let X- U(0,8km) = 5 km 
total time within range T = 2~ x 3600 seclhr = 225 sees 200kmlhr 
let TA- Exp(.03) = 30 sees and TR = 8 sees 
Eqn (7) TE = (0.50 x 225) - (30 + 8) = 74.5 sees 
STEP 3: Determine the number of shots. 
Eqn (8) Nshots = min {[ (0.2 per sec) x 74.5 sees = 14.9]. 4 ms/s} = 4 
STEP 4: Determine the number of aircraft destroyed assuming SSPK = 0.65. 
since Nshots s A(i), let L- Bin(n = 4, p =.65) = 2 aircraft 
:. Aircraft surviving to next flight path segment= 10 - 2 = 8 aircraft 
b. AirtoAir 
Air to air combat only occurs if a Defensive Counter Air or DCA Mission as 
described in the.JWAEP Version 2.0 User Documentation, Section V: Air War, is generated 
against the flight of attack helicopters. 
If a DCA Mission has been generated and the intercepting flight of aircraft has 
acquired the attack helicopter flight, it is assumed the attacking force acquires, identifies, and 
fires on the attack helicopter defending flight first. The defending attack helicopter flight 
automatically detects the attacking flight after it fires and is then given the opportunity to 
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respond. The defending flight can disperse and seek cover and concealment or return fire 
based on the calculated advantage ratio. 
The advantage ratio, ADV(atk), measures the relative advantage the attacking 
force has over the defending flight in terms of speed and weapons ranges. The ratio: 
ADV(atk) = a [( Ratk) x ( Satk)] 
Rdef Sdef 
(11) 
where Ri is the max air to air munition range of the attacking or defending force i, and .s; 
is the avg combat speed of the attacking or defending aircraft type. The parameter a is user 
defined and can be used to weight the attack advantage ratio if necessary. Depending on the 
aircraft type and mission, the advantage ratio may need to be adjusted to make helicopters 
more or less willing to return fire since it is being compared to a fixed value as discussed 
below. The default setting for the weight is a = 1 unless the mission type dictates otherwise. 
If a flight of helicopters is attacked by a superior force the most advantageous 
tactic is to disperse and seek cover and concealment (break contact and get away). A 
"superior force" is defined as a force that has at least a three to one advantage over the 
defender. Therefore, the defender will only return fire if ADV(atk) < 3. 
If ADV(atk) < 3, then the defending helicopter flight returns fire 
The use of the advantage ratio helps to minimize engagements between 
defending helicopters and fixed wing attacking forces. If an attack helicopter flight is 
attacked by fixed winged force the accepted tactic is for the helicopter flight to scatter, seek 
cover and concealment, and break contact. If a helicopter force is attacked by another 
helicopter force, however, it may be necessary for the defending helicopter force to return fire 
to facilitate breaking contact. The advantage ratio for opposing helicopter forces will 
normally be less than three which allow both to engage each other. 
Assuming opposing forces come into contact as the result of an air combat 
mission (there are no random air to air meeting engagements modeled for air attacks against 
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helicopters), air to air attrition is adjudicated in two steps, (1) the attacking force fires and 
defender losses are assessed, and (2) based on the calculated advantage ratio, the defending 
force may fire and the attacker losses are assessed. It is assumed that the defending force 
detects the attacking force only after being fired upon. The air to air engagements against 
helicopters are limited to one engagement per side which is a simplifying assumption based 
on the relatively uncommon occurrence of air to air engagements. Therefore, the attrition 
calculations will only occur at most twice per mission for an en route air to air engagement. 
Air to air losses are determined the same way en route surface to air losses are 
determined. The main difference is the use of an SSPK value derived from an aggregated 
probability ofkill. The single shot probability of kill or SSPK is equivalent to an aggregated 
weapons PK (Eqn 12). The aggregated weapons probability of kill, PKagg{a}, is for a single 
aircraft and uses the same form as described in the Air Force Studies and Analysis Agency 
Thunder Analyst's Manual, Version 6.1, May 1994, page 13-111. The formula used is: 
(12) 
where PKi(a) is the probability of kill for weapon type i against aircraft a, and FL; is the 
fractional number oflaunches for weapon i. 
Example 3.4: Aggregate Probability of Kill. A MIG-23 is carrying 2 AA-2 and 2 AA-7 missiles 
and makes four launches per engagement Calculate the SSPK if the weapons have a 0.6 and 
0.5 PK respectively. 
STEP 1: Determine the fractional launches for each weapon. 
for the AA-2: 
for the AA-7: 
2 weapons I 4 launches = }3 
2 weapons I 4 launches= }3 
STEP 2: Calculate the SSPK. 
Eqn (10) SSPK = PK,99 (a) = (0.6)Y2 + (0.5)Y2 = 0.55 
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The number of shots an attacking flight can deliver is based on the number of 
aircraft in the flight and the number oflaunches each aircraft can make: 
NShots = (NFlightf x NLaunchesf) (13) 
where NFlight1 = number of aircraft in the flight that is firing, 
NLaunches1 = number of launches per engagement. 
Losses are then determined following the same steps as outlined for en route 
surface to air losses. The binomial draw is used in cases where Nshots s A (i) and Bernoulli 
trials for each aircraft are used if Nshots > A (i); the same logic as discussed previously is 
used to allocate missiles per defending aircraft. 
EXAMPLE 3.5: Air to Air Attrition Adjudication. Given an attacking flight of two MIG-23 
aircraft (as described in Example 3.3) against a flight of 10 AH-64 attack helicopters, determine 
the losses for each side. Assume the flights are in contact. 
STEP 1: Determine defending AH-64 losses from MIG-23 attack. 
Ex 3.3 SSPK = .55 
Eqn (13) NShots = (2 M/Gs) x (4/aunches) = 8 shots 
Nshots=8 s. A(i)=1 0 therefore the binomial draw can be used; let X- Bin(n=1 0, p=0.55) = 5:. 
1 0-5 = 5 AH-64s survive attack 
*Given 3 MIGs, Nshots = 12. Therefore, shots are allocated so 8 aircraft are fired at with one 
missile each and two aircraft are fired at with two missiles each. The probability of kill for each 
aircraft is: 
Aircraft attacked with one missile: PK=SSPK 
Aircraft attacked with two missiles: PK = 1 - ( 1 - SSPK )2 
STEP 2: Determine attacker losses if applicable. 
Eqn (11) ADV(atk) = ( Ro~k=1Dkm) x ( s.k=SDDkmlhr) = 3_33 R,.,=7.5km S,.,=2DDkmlhr ADV(atk) '(:. 3 
:. The defending helicopters do not return fire. There are no attacker losses and the air to air 
engagement is finished. 
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3. Objective Area Attrition 
Objective area attrition is defined as the destruction of attack helicopters, ground 
forces or other air forces as a result of action that takes place while the attacking helicopter 
forces are in fixed battle positions. Hostile air defense weapon systems and threat fixed wing 
air and attack helicopters conducting air-to-air combat missions remain a threat to attacking 
helicopters and can still cause attrition. The major change is the attacking helicopter forces' 
ability to cause attrition. 
Attrition is now two-sided with respect to hostile ADA and threat air, but only one 
sided against maneuver ground forces. It is assumed that fires from maneuver ground forces 
against attack helicopters are normally out of range when helicopters are in stand -off battle 
positions or have negligible effects. Figure 3.6 depicts the possible objective area attrition 
interactions. 
Figure 3. 6 Possible Objective Area Attrition Interaction. 
The dynamics of possible force interactions at the objective area make it feasible for 
different forces (ground ADA weapons and attack helicopters) to engage each other 
simultaneously. Therefore, objective area attrition will be adjudicated in time steps based on 
an engagement cycle to represent nearly simultaneous engagements. 
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The engagement cycle is based on attack helicopter actions in the battle position. The 
BP is the location from which the attack helicopter engages targets but is also an area that 
provides cover and concealment from enemy forces and maneuver area for multiple firing 
positions. Attack helicopters normally unmask to engage targets for a short time, mask and 
reposition, then unmask to engage targets again. If the attack helicopters are outside the 
range of any possible threat they can remain unmasked the entire time in the BP but that 
scenario will not be considered for modeling purposes. The assumption that each attack 
helicopter will engage targets in accordance with a unmasked engagement and masked 
movement cycle is used. 
The cycle length is determined using a normal distributions and user defined 
parameters for average unmasked and masked times and standard deviations in the BP. 
Let Unmask Time (k) ~Normal (p, = avg unmask time, o = std dev unmask time) and 
Let Mask Time (k) ~Normal (p, = avg mask time, o = std dev mask time) 
The total cycle length is the sum of the unmasked and masked time. The total number 
of cycles k = { 1, 2, ... , K} depend on the number of munitions fired per cycle and the total 
number of munitions carried or on the mission abort criteria. It is assumed the attack 
helicopters expend all munitions if the mission abort criteria is not reached. 
Another important consideration for objective area attrition adjudication is the range 
from the BP to the target. The range to target is used as an input to determine appropriate 
probabilities of kill for aircraft and ground based ADA weapons. The range to target will 
vary based on individual aircraft positions so a draw from an average distance is used. The 
range to target distance is a function of the attack helicopter unit's average BP to target 
distance which is a user defined value for both day and night conditions. This allows the user 
to define a range that can reflect both weapons standoff ranges and the optical capabilities of 
the aircraft. 
The range, RBP-mr , is based on a draw from a normal distribution using the user 
defined average BP to target range found in the mission type supporting data file. 
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Let RBP-TGT -Normal (p= avg BPrng, o = .2 p) 
The spread of RBP-TGT is limited to three standard deviations about the mean to prevent the 
use of any unrealistic values. 
Objective area attrition adjudication is conducted in accordance with engagement 
cycles but is sequential within each cycle. The attack helicopters attrit the ground force, 
ground ADA weapons have the opportunity to attrit the attack helicopters, and then air to air 
attrition is assessed if it applies. The sequential scheme is based on the idea that an attacking 
helicopter force using cover and concealment will normally be able to occupy their BP and 
begin an engagement undetected. It is unlikely that ADA weapons and attacking aircraft will 
engage the attack helicopters at the same time, and air to air engagements are the least likely 
to occur. 
a. Air to Surface 
Air to surface attrition is caused by the attack helicopter unit firing on ground 
targets. It occurs once per engagement cycle and follows a two step process where (1) the 
total number of detected ground vehicles are determined and (2) ground vehicle losses are 
assessed. The process continues until all the ATKHB point fire missiles are expended or the 
mission abort criteria is reached. 
The total number of ground vehicles detected is determined using binomial 
draws for each vehicle type v and the probability that line of sight exists between the 
helicopters in battle positions and the vehicles for the given terrain type t. Therefore, each 
trial size varies depending on the vehicle type but the probability of line of sight, P LOS1 , is 
the same for each trial. 
Let Xv = number of vehicles type v detected, 
then Xv- Binomial ( n = nv, p = PLOS1) for all vehicles v = {1, 2, ... , V} 
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The detected vehicles are then rank ordered by vehicle priority in accordance 
with user defined priorities based on the attack helicopter unit and the specific mission type. 
EXAMPLE 3.6: Air to Surface Attrition Adjudication. Given opposing forces as described 
in Chapter I (an ATKHB with 10 AH-64's each with 16 Hellfire missiles attacking a ground force 
with 130 T80 tanks, 2 ZSU's, 2 SA-13's, 2 SA-6's, and 14 BMP's), determine the ground force 
attrition for the first engagement cycle. It is assumed that all aircraft made it to the objective 
area. The objective area is located in terrain that is rolling with an estimated PLOS = 0.55 for 
the BP range to target (6.5 km). The vehicle priority is (1) ADA, (2) tank, and (3) mechanized 
forces. 
STEP 1: Determine number of enemy vehicles detected by the ATKHB and corresponding 
vehicle rank order. 
Use binomial draws for each vehicle type: 
SA-6 - Bin(n=2, p=.55) = 1 rank order: A1 
SA-13 - Bin(n=2, p=.55) = 0 
zsu - Bin(n=2, p=.55) = 1 A2 
T80 - Bin(n=130, p=.55) = 72 T1- T72 
BMP - Bin(n=14, p=.55) = 8 M1-M8 
The possible number of missiles, Nmsls(k), that can be fired at the rank 
ordered targets is determined based on the unmasked time for the current engagement cycle, 
the user defined average missile shot time, and the total number of aircraft for the current 
cycle, A(k): 
Nmsls (k) = ( unmask tim~ (k)) x A(k) 
avg shot tzme 
where Nmsls(k) is rounded to the nearest integer value. 
EXAMPLE 3.6 (a): 
STEP 2: Determine total number of missiles fired. 
Let unmask time - N(1J=15 sec, o=3 sec) = 18 sec, assuming user defined mean and std dev 
parameters for the mission type. 
Eqn (14) Nmsls = l 18 sec ) x 10 aircraft = 22.5 
\avg shot t1me = 8 sec 
:. 23 missiles 
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(14) 
The ground vehicle attrition is then calculated using either perfect fire 
distribution command and control (C2) or random fire distribution C2. Perfect C2 insures 
that each missile is fired at a different target. Random C2 allows for the possibility of more 
than one missile being fired at the same target, and is generally more realistic. 
Attrition is assessed for each vehicle type v for every engagement cycle. 
Let Nv (k) be the number of vehicles type vat the start of cycle k and 
NKv (k) be the number of vehicles killed during cycle k, 
then Nv(k+ I) = NJk) - NKv (k) 
The number of missiles allocated to each vehicle type is less than or equal to 
the number of vehicles of the given type detected. For example, given the rank ordered 
targeted vehicles, if the first three are ADA weapons followed by ten tanks and only five 
missiles are to be fired, the first three missiles are allocated to fire at ADA weapons and the 
last two are allocated against the tanks. If perfect C2 is used, each missile is fired at a 
different target - each target is drawn from the target set in rank order with no replacement 
between draws. If random C2 is used, each missile is fired at a target drawn from the target 
set but the selected target is then replaced and is available for the next draw (sampling with 
replacement). 
Losses are determined for each vehicle based on a Bernoulli trial given the PK 
value. The PK is computed using the standard form PK = 1 - ( 1 - SSPKfshots where the 
SSPK is the user defined value for the aircraft type a against the ground vehicle type v and 
the number of shots is dependent on the perfect or random C2 missile allocations. If perfect 
C2 is used the number of shots per vehicle will be equal to one in every case. The number 
of shots can be greater than one only when random C2 is used. 
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EXAMPLE 3.6 (b): 
STEP 3: Allocate each missile to a targeted vehicle based on the prioritized rank ordered 
targets. Perfect and Random C2 allocations are shown. 
Perfect C2: 1-A 1 2-P\2. 3-T1 4-T2 5-T3 6-T4 7-T5 thru 23-T21 
Random C2: 1-P\2. 2-P\2. 3-T6 4-T22 5-T? 6-T18 7 thru 23- random T(i) 
fori = 1, 2, 3, ... , 72 selected tanks. 
Note: The number of missiles allocated each vehicle type does not exceed the number of 
vehides of that type. In this example only two ADA vehicles were detected, therefore, only two 
missiles are allocated against ADA vehicles. Otherwise, the missiles are allocated by vehicle 
priority. Note also, that the labels are arbitrary and serve only to identify targets engaged with 
more than one missile. 
STEP 4: Assess the ground force vehicle losses based on SSPK values for engagements 
between AH-64's and the given ground vehicle type at a range of 6.5 km and the number of 
missiles fired at the given target. Random C2 attrition is the only method shown in this example. 
Each vehicle is attrited based on a Bernoulli trial: let X-U{O, 1 ), if x~ PK for the engagement 
then the vehicle is killed. Recall, if using Random C2 there may be more than one missile fired 
at the target and then the PK no longer equals the SSPK. The SSPK values are all fixed at .85 





2 msls fired (PK=.9775) and X-U{O, 1 )=.5467 
1 msl fired (PK=.85) and 
1 msl fired (PK=.85) and 
X-U{O, 1 )=.8971 
X-U{O, 1 )=.3215 
:. P\2. killed 
:. T6 survives 
:. T22 killed 
STEP 5: Subtract losses from ground force to determine strength at start of next cycle. 
SA-6(k+1) =2-0=2 
SA-13(k+1) =2-0=2 
ZSU(k+1) =2-1=1 (P\2. killed) 
T80(k+1) = 130- 18 = 112 (18 tanks killed of 21 that were fired at) 
BMP(k+1) = 14-0 = 14 (no BMPs were fired at) 
The missile count is updated each cycle and cycles continue until all missiles are 
expended or the mission abort criteria is reached. 
Let M(k) be the number of missiles remaining at the start of cycle k and 
MF(k) be the number of missiles fired in cycle k, 
then M(k+ 1) = M(k) - MF(k) 
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b. Suiface to Air 
Surface to air attrition takes place every engagement cycle k following air to 
surface adjudication if the ATKHB is in a BP within the lethal range of an ADA system. If 
more than one ADA system is within range, it is assumed all ADA systems within range are 
netted; all communicate to insure perfect command and control. Assuming perfect C2, the 
ADA system that has the shortest range is used to fire at the observed aircraft. The longer 
range ADA systems are usually reserved for use against the fixed wing aviation threat. 
The adjudication steps as outlined for en route surface to air attrition in Section 
2.a. apply with the following modifications. The ADA lethal ranges are determined the same 
way following Step 1 procedures and are used to determine if the flight is engaged. 
lf ReP-TGr ~ RL (n) then the ADA system type n has the opportunity to fire 
at the attack helicopters type a. This is done for all N ADA systems. 
The number of shots the ADA system can take is calculated using equation (8) 
with a few modifications. The possible number of aircraft observed is determined using a 
binomial draw given the total number of aircraft for the engagement cycle, A(k), and the 
PLOS value for the given terrain type; A(k) Obs -Binomial ( n = A(k) ,p = PLOSt ). The 
engagement time is equal to the engagement cycle unmask time; TE = Unmask Time (k). 
Therefore, equation (8) is modified such that 
Nshots = min { [(Weapon Rate of Fire) x Unmask Time (k)], Ntot}. 
The value for the number of aircraft observed for the given cycle, A(k)Obs, may 
seem to be a conservative estimate but is actually a fairly good approximation. The ADA 
weapon systems are normally placed to protect the rest of the ground vehicles from threat air 
attack and maximize their ability to observe the main threat air avenues of approach. The 
PLOS for a given ADA system against an air threat is probably higher than the average point 
to point PLOS for the given terrain type which is used in the calculation. Therefore, the 
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calculation for the number of observable attack helicopters is based on the total number of 
aircraft (rather than the unmasked aircraft) to compensate for the possible low PLOS value 
used. The estimate would in fact be too low if all the aircraft were unmasked at the same 
time, which is not likely to occur. Based on the different attack methods as discussed in 
Chapter II, Section D, the actual number of aircraft that are unmasked at a given time can 
vary greatly and is normally between one-third to two-thirds of the total force. 
The attrition assessment is then determined the same way as described in Step 4 
for en route surface to air attrition. 
c. AirtoAir 
Air to air attrition adjudication is conducted the same way en route air to air 
attrition is handled. The air to air attrition adjudication follows the surface to air and air to 
surface attrition adjudication for the engagement cycle taking place when the attacking flight 
arrives. 
E. THE MISSION CYCLE 
The mission cycle refers to the mission readiness capabilities of the unit. As discussed 
in Chapter II, each attack helicopter unit has a specific mission planning and execution cycle 
to maximize mission support ability. Some units operate primarily at night while others 
operate during the day. The mission planning cycle defines these day and night blocks and 
is simplified by dividing the day into two 12 hour blocks, one for day and the other for night. 
This is consistent with the default air mission cycles that are used for fixed-wing aircraft in 
the current version of JWAEP (Youngren and Lovell, 1996). 
The unit planning cycle is a user defined parameter that works in conjunction with the 
user defined unit day and night mission values. A unit that can execute one day mission and 
two night missions, for example, will be limited to three missions for the 24 hour period. The 
missions are scheduled every 12 hours in accordance with the planning cycle. Units are 
allowed to exceed day and night mission parameters but only with penalty. The maximum 
number of missions executed can not exceed two times the user defined number ( 2 x day or 
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night msn #)and only for critical missions based on target priority. If the mission numbers 
are exceeded then the unit must remain inactive (no missions assigned) for the next planning 
cycle. 
The mission cycle and number of day and night missions can be changed but again, 
following a change, the unit remains inactive for the next cycle. The inactive periods are used 
to represent the minimum time it takes a unit to adjust to a new mission cycle. 
F. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 
The major classes of supply that are explicitly tracked for the unit's attack aircraft and 
are Classes Ill and V, aircraft fuel and ammunition. The unit base.dat file establishes the 
basic loads of each class for the specified re-supply cycle. For example, 12,500 gal of JP-4, 
384 Hellfire, 1,824 70mm Rkts, and 28,800 30mm as depicted in the ViperBase.dat file. 
Those values also indicate the unit's fuel and ammunition capacity based on organic and 
additional OPCON assets that are normally task organized with the attack helicopter unit. 
The mission logistics requirements are calculated for every mission once the flight 
route and the mission force size are determined. The logistics calculation serves three 
purposes: it decrements the current supply levels, provides a point estimate for future 
mission logistics requirements, and serves as a check to see if the mission is logistically 
feasible. 
The fuel expended is based on the number of aircraft for the mission, the aircraft fuel 
bum rate, the distance to the target, and an added fixed time of 30 minutes to account for BP 
time, run-up time, and mission reserve requirements. 
fuel u~ed = n aircraft x [( 2 x fit path dist) + 0.5 hrs] x fuel burn rate (15) 
avg msn speed 
The ingress and egress flight path distances may vary but are assumed to be close enough to 
simply double the ingress route distance. 
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The number of expended rounds of ammunition is calculated based on the number of 
aircraft for the mission and the weapons load configuration. It is assumed that all aircraft 
expend all ammunition. 
ammoi used = (n aircraft) x (ammoi loaded) Vi type ammo 
EXAMPLE 3.7: Calculating Logistical Requirements. The ATKHB is conducting an attack 
using 1 0 AH-64 attack helicopters each with a heavy weapons load (16 Hellfire and 1500 
30mm). The selected flight path distance is 120km from base to objective area. 
STEP 1: Determine fuel required. 
Eqn(15) fuel= 10x[( 2 ' 120 km }+O.Shrs]" (fuelbumrate=142gph) = 2414gals 8111 msn speed = 200 kmph 
STEP 2: Determine ammunition required. 
Eqn (16) Hellfire = 1 0 " 16 = 160 missiles and 30mm = 10" 1500 = 15000rounds 
G. MISSION TARGETING 
(16) 
The entire process of selecting targets and then assigning those targets to appropriate 
forces is an area that is beyond the scope of this thesis but merits some discussion. The 
assumption that attack helicopter missions are generated based on the assignment of targets 
to attack helicopter units is an important foundation to this thesis work. Therefore, there are 
several concepts that are relevant and should be included in the development of an attack 
mission generation module that follows simple, logical steps in the assignment of any target. 
Target selection should be based on the principle of determining the opposing forces 
"critical" units and then targeting them based on a user defined priority. A "critical" unit 
could be defined as a unit that potentially could have the greatest impact on current and/or 
future operations. One way to select targets would be based on a target list data file that 
would list the expected types of opposing forces and the relative importance a commander 
would place on them based on the type of mission being conducted. For example, if a Blue 
armored division is conducting an attack against a defending Red mechanized corps, an 
important target would be any Red reserve armored force ofbattalion size or greater. If such 
a force is detected based on battlefield perception, it would be targeted with a high priority. 
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The deep target, not currently engaged by other ground forces, that is assigned to the 
attack helicopter unit must be selected using a logical algorithm that considers several 
factors. The target selection algorithm should incorporate the type of target and its priority, 
the major ground force responsible for the target area, and deep attack assets available. The 
type of target and available assets is important because certain targets are better suited for 
specific available weapons. Deep strike weapons include attack helicopters as well as long 
range artillery and fixed wing aircraft. Therefore, an attack helicopter mission should be 
generated for an ATKHB if it is the best asset for the target or if it is the only asset that can 
hit the target. 
A method of associating a major ground unit with an operational area (an area within 
which the major unit can directly influence with combat forces - the rear, close, and deep 
battle areas) would enhance the ability to assign targets to appropriate units and weapon 
systems. The most straight forward way to associate targets with major ground forces is 
based on the ground unit's sphere of influence. The sphere of influence for a given unit can 
be defined as the area within which the unit can directly impact combat operations. A 
division, for example, may be able to influence the battlefield up to 12 hours out or 120 km 
assuming a ground movement speed of 10 km per hour and a corps may be able to influence 
the battlefield up to 24 to 72 hours out. The areas would be based on available organic 
weapon systems, the terrain, and commanders intent. 
As targets are selected and prioritized in the given unit areas, they would be assigned 
to subordinate organic forces. If the unit does not have the appropriate force or weapon 
system for a selected target, the target would be assigned to the unit's parent unit. For 
example, if a division is assigned an attack helicopter battalion target but its only attack 
battalion has been destroyed, the mission would then be assigned to the division's parent 
corps. 
H. MODELING "RED" ATTACK HELICOPTER FORCES 
The modeling of attack helicopter operations for forces that are different from U.S. 
forces can also be handled using the same logic that has been described in this thesis or 
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currently exists in the JWAEP Version 2. 0 Simulation. The two methods that can be used 
depend on the way in which the attack helicopter forces are doctrinally employed. If they are 
employed in a way that resembles U.S. attack helicopter operations, then the module 
described in this thesis can be used. The alternative is to use the existing JW AEP air war 
logic if their employment more closely resembles Air Force type employment - individual 
aircraft assigned to sortie packages for specific missions. 
The unique data files associated with every attack helicopter unit make it possible to 
represent different forces (forces that may be organized differently and use different 
employment techniques). The files as described in Section A contain the information that 
makes that unit unique. The aircrajt.dat file is obviously unique but the real power to 
change the way in which the Red ATKHB operates is by changing the parameters in the 
unit.dat and mission type.dat files. 
The current version of the JW AEP Simulation describes how attack helicopter forces 
can be represented in the air war module in the close air support or strike role (Youngren and 
Lovell, 1996). There are some limitations in portraying helicopter operations using the air 
war module but these are probably insignificant if the attack helicopters are employed like 
attack fixed wing aircraft. 
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IV. MODEL DEMONSTRATION 
This chapter demonstrates the network flight path selection algorithm and objective 
area attrition. The purpose is to demonstrate face validity by showing the results obtained 
using the methodology outlined in Chapter III given typical test scenarios. The intent is to 
better familiarize the reader with these two specific modeling areas and to show the variability 
gained by using the stochastic techniques previously described. 
A. FLIGHT PATH GENERATION 
The network "shortest path" algorithm used to define the optimal flight path is 
demonstrated using a 24-node network. The network is a portion of the 64-node network 
that was developed to represent the mobility corridors of the Korea Major Regional 
Contingency (MRC) in Karl M. Schmidt's Master's Thesis, Design Methodology for FTLM, 
1993. The 24-node network is depicted in Figure 4 .1. A detailed arc and node index with 
associated distances and threat levels can be found in Appendix B. 
Kosong (DPRK) 
Suwon Wonju 
Figure 4.1 24-Node Network. The depicted network is a portion of 
the 64-node network developed for the Korea :MRC [Sclunidt, 1993). The 
arcs and nodes that are highlighted in bold have (randomly assigned) threat 
levels that are fixed for flight path demonstration purposes. The network as 
depicted is not drawn to scale. 
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Flight paths were generated for four different test cases using three different weighting 
methods each. All cases used node 34 0V onju) as the starting node S. The threat levels for 
the arcs and nodes north of nodes 23, 28, 30, and 31 were assigned randomly and remained 
fixed for each case. 
1. Test Cases 
The four test cases are outlined in Table 4.1 and are defined by the start nodeS, and 
the target node T. Three flight paths were selected for each test case based on a different 
weighting scheme. Recall the calculation for the (i,j) flight path segment for risk is: 
rif = wd(dif/ R) + w1 tif. The three weighting schemes varied to place the priority on (I) 
the distance with wa= 1, (2) the threat level with W1 = 1, and (3) equal between the threat and 
the distance with Wa = 0.5 and W1 = 0.5. 
Case Start Node Target Node 
1 34- Wonju 16- Munsan 
2 34- Wonju 13- P'Yonggang (DPRK) 
3 34- Wonju 10 - Kosong (DPRK) 
4 34- Wonju 23- Kansong 
Table 4.1 Flight Path Test Cases. 
2. Test Results 
The results for all twelve flight paths are shown in Table 4.2 and include the total 
distance and threat for the path chosen. The results show how potentially sensitive the 
selected flight path may be to the weight assigned to the threat level. Case 3 provides an 
example. The target node for Case 3 is just within the combat range (250 km) of the aircraft 
and a flight path is only selected when the weight for distance is equal to one; the path is 
based only on the distance. When the flight path is selected based on risk only, the target 
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node is no longer within range. The test results indicate that the weight should favor distance 
over threat level for targets at ranges close to the combat range of the aircraft. The results 
also indicate that a lower bound should probably be placed on the distance weight, w d , to 
insure the path selected is never based solely on threat levels. 
Total Distance Total Threat 
Case Priority Selected Flight Path I: d .. I: tiJ 
(iJ) EFlt Path lj (iJ) EFlt Path 
distance 34-+63-+28-+ I6 I85km .09 
I 
threat 34-+63-+28-+ I6 I85km .09 
even 34-+63-+28-+ I6 I85 km .09 
distance 34-+63-+3I-+29-+ I9-+ I3 206km 2.55 
2 
threat 34-+63-+28-+26-+ I8-+ 13 250km 2.26 
even 34 -+63-+ 3I-+29-+ I9-+ I3 206km 2.55 
distance 34-+63-+ 3I-+30-+23-+22-+ I 0 234km 2.85 
3 
threat tgt not within range based on n/a n/a 
risk adjusted fit path 
even tgt not within range based on n/a n/a 
risk adjusted fit path 
distance 34-+63-+30-+23 I86km 1.3I 
4 
threat 34-+35-+23 220km 0 
even 34-+35-+23 220km 0 
Table 4.2 Network Flight Path Test Results. 
The network flight path trees associated with each weighting method are illustrated 
in Figures 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4. 
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P 'Y onggang (DPRK) Kosong (DPRK) 
~ 
Wonju 
Figure 4.2 Flight Path Tree (Priority to Distance). 
Samchok 
Wonju 




Figure 4.4 Flight Path Tree (Equal Priority). 
B. OBJECTIVE AREA ATTRITION 
The objective area attrition was demonstrated using a spreadsheet simulation to 
represent the attrition interaction between forces as outlined in the scenario described in 
Chapter I. The starting force strengths, BP to target range, PLOS value, and the SSPK 
values remained fixed for each of the ten replications that were run. The effects of en route 
attrition were not considered for the purposes of this demonstration. 
1. Test Scenario 
The simulations were set up with an AH-64 ATKHB attacking an Independent Tank 
Regiment (ITR). The starting force strength for the Blue Force was 10 AH-64's based on the 
required number of aircraft to destroy 70% of the ITR total force (1 05 of 150 combat 
vehicles). The Red Force starting strength was the same as outlined in Table 1.2, Chapter I. 
The Red Force (Listed by ATKHB attack priority) included 2 SA-6 ADA, 2 SA-13 ADA, 
2 ZSU ADA, 130 T-80 tanks, and 14 BMP's. The mission abort criteria for the ATKHB was 
set at five aircraft; if five or more aircraft were destroyed, the ATKHB aborted the mission 
and broke off the engagement. 
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The objective area node used for the test replications was Munsan (node 16 from the 
24-Node Network) with a PLOS equal to 0.38 . The PLOS value used is based on the 
Department of the Army Intervisibility Classification Study, TRAC-WS:MR.-TR-23-86, 
Volume 1, October 1986, Table 6-5, page 6-14. The BP to target range was set at 4 km 
which is a realistic distance for the type of aircraft used. 
One of the test cases in which three engagement cycles were completed is shown 
below to illustrate the types of values associated with each engagement cycle and how they 
changed as the respective forces were attrited. Note the differences achieved between the use 
of Perfect C2 and Random C2. 
Engagement Cycle 1 
Command and Control 
vehicle tvpe 
begin strength = N1 (1) 
#observed - Bin(N1 (1) , PLOS) 
total missile allocation 
#vehicles fired at 
#vehicles killed 
end strength = N1 (2) 
begin strength = A(1) 
#observed - Bin(A(1 ), PLOS) 
total ADA missile allocation 
# A/C fired at 
#A/C killed 
end strength = A(2) 
unmask time: 21.6 seconds 
Perfect C2 
SA-6 SA-13 ZSU T-80 BMP 
2 2 2 130 14 
2 0 0 48 2 
2 0 0 25 0 
2 0 0 25 0 
2 0 0 21 0 






TotATKHB Shots: 27 missiles 
Random C2 
SA-6 SA-13 ZSU T-80 BMP 
2 2 2 130 14 
2 0 0 48 2 
2 0 0 25 0 
2 0 0 20 0 
2 0 0 19 0 
0 2 2 111 14 
Engagement Cycle 2 
Command and Control 
vehicle tvpe 
begin strength = N1 (2) 
#observed - Bin(N1 (2) , PLOS) 
total missile allocation 
#vehicles fired at 
# vehicles killed 
end strength = N1 (3) 
begin strength = A(2) 
#observed - Bin(A(2), PLOS) 
total ADA missile allocation 
#A/C fired at 
#A/C killed 
end strength = A(3) 
Engagement Cycle 3 
Command and Control 
vehicle !Yoe 
begin strength = N1 (3) 
#observed - Bin(N1 (2) , PLOS) 
total missile allocation 
#vehicles fired at 
#vehicles killed 
end strength = N1 (3) 
begin strength = A(3) 
#observed - Bin(A(3), PLOS) 
total ADA missile allocation 
# AIC fired at 
#A/C killed 
end strength = A(4) 
Final Outcome: 
unmask time: 22.22 seconds 
Perfect C2 
SA-6 SA-13 ZSU T-80 BMP 
0 2 2 109 14 
0 0 2 52 6 
0 0 2 23 0 
0 0 2 23 0 
0 0 2 21 0 








unmask time: 8.34 seconds 
Perfect C2 


























TotATKHB Shots: 25 missiles 
Random C2 
SA-6 SA-13 ZSU T-80 BMP 
0 2 2 111 14 
0 0 2 51 6 
0 0 2 23 0 
0 0 1 20 0 
0 0 18 0 
0 2 93 14 
Tot ATKHB Shots: 7 missiles 
Random C2 
SA-6 SA-13 ZSU T-80 BMP 
0 2 0 93 14 
0 0 30 6 
0 0 6 0 
0 0 5 0 
0 0 4 0 
0 0 89 14 
5 * Mission abort criteria met - engagement ends and remaining A/C 











2. Test Results 
The objective area attrition results obtained from 10 test replications of the scenario 
described are summarized in Table 4.3. It is interesting to note that in eight of ten 
replications, the ATKHB broke off the attack because the abort criteria was met. Given the 
ADA threat encountered, that is reasonable. An ATKHB conducting a mission as portrayed 
in the scenario would have additional support like electronic warfare assets and artillery to 
help suppress enemy air defenses. No additional mission support assets were included in this 
simulation so the test results obtained make sense. 
1Jepli~@i()'! 
Eng Cycles 4 3 2 11 3 2 3 13 3 4 
MsnAbort yes yes yes no yes yes yes no yes yes 
Aircraft Killed 6 5 6 5 6 7 4 5 5 
PerfectC2 
Red Killed 55 51 24 137 53 31 51 136 44 45 
%Red Killed 37% 34% 16% 91% 36% 21% 34% 91% 29% 30% 
RandomC2 
Red Killed 50 46 19 115 39 21 32 117 30 39 
%Red Killed 33% 31% 13% 77% 26% 14% 21% 78% 20% 26% 
Table 4.3 Objective Area Attrition Results. 
The results also showed that in the cases when the ATKHB expended all missiles, the 
enemy ground force was attrited as expected. The mission force size was determined based 
on the number of aircraft required to destroy 70% of the ground force so the simulation 
should have shown at least 70% attrition as it did. Another result that was expected was the 
difference in attrition between perfect and random command and control. The number of 
vehicles killed using perfect C2 was higher than the number killed using random C2, however, 




This thesis describes some basic modeling formulations that can be used to represent 
attack helicopter operations in theater level simulations. The attack helicopter module 
describes the major events that take place in deliberate attack helicopter operations and the 
formulations that can be used to represent them. The goal was the development of simple, 
straight forward stochastic models to support the realistic portrayal of attack helicopter 
operations. 
Although the emphasis of the thesis was the representation of attack helicopters 
conducting deliberate attacks, many of the areas discussed have applications that can be used 
to represent any helicopter operation. Many of the formulations are general in scope and 
simple enough to be modified to represent other types of helicopter forces and different 
missions. An effort was also made to represent helicopter forces in the same way that ground 
maneuver forces are represented. Many low resolution simulations fail to model helicopter 
forces or model them in the same way that fixed wing aircraft are represented. 
The attack helicopter module has been developed to be incorporated into the Joint 
Warfare Analysis Experimental Prototype (JW AEP) but can easily be used in any theater 
level model. It should be pointed out, however, the formulations and module logic have not 
yet been validated. Face validity has been shown with examples and demonstration results 
discussed in Chapter IV but further testing is required. Additional simulation should be used 
to obtain module output which in tum can be compared with results from high resolution 
models, exercises (e.g., National Training Center data), and possibly some historical data that 
more accurately characterize attack helicopter operations. The attack helicopter module 
cannot be verified until it has been coded and tested in the actual JW AEP simulation. 
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B. TOPICS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
1. Targeting 
A module needs to be developed that addresses the issues of how to identify, 
prioritize, and assign targets. The targeting process is complicated and is often not 
represented well in combat simulations. A simple module that identifies and then follows a 
logical algorithm to prioritize and assign targets to major units (division and higher) should 
be explored. The unit or weapon system within the major command that is most suitable for 
the mission can then be assigned the given target. 
2. Line of Sight Probabilities 
The probability that an observer from a given location has line of sight to a target 
location is an important concept in combat simulations. The problem that needs to be 
addressed in JW AEP is how to implicitly model the impact of line of sight, or more 
importantly the obstruction ofline of sight has on helicopter operations. Therefore, a more 
thorough study ofline of sight is required. PLOS distribution curves or look up tables are 
needed to support the air to ground line of sight interactions associated with low altitude 
helicopter operations. 
The probability that line of sight exists between helicopters and ground forces is 
different than the typical PLOS used to characterize ground engagements which is normally 
used in simulations. First, the vantage points are different. Helicopters typically operate at 
altitudes from 10 to 200 feet above ground level which can have a significant impact on line 
of sight probabilities depending on the type of terrain. The other not so obvious difference 
is the tactical employment of forces to maximize line of sight capabilities. Attack helicopters 
normally occupy battle positions that have the best line of sight vantage points for a given 
engagement area. Conversely, ground based ADA systems are employed to cover the most 
likely air avenues of approach and also seek the best line of sight vantage points to target 
threat aircraft. 
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3. Attack Module Complexity 
This thesis represents the initial research in the fonnulation of models to represent the 
portrayal of helicopter operations in JW AEP. The modeling fonnulations in this thesis are 
fairly simple and several areas should be enhanced to make the module more robust. 
One area worthy of attention is attrition. All the attrition models can be made more 
complex to allow for more force interactions. For example, enhancements to allow ground 
forces to engage helicopters with small arms fire. The effect small arms fire has on attack 
helicopters in the conduct of a mission may be negligible but that type of fire can have 
significant effects on other helicopter forces. The formulations which support the deliberate 
attack mission do not include attrition due to area fire weapons like the 70mm rocket or short 
range weapons like the 30mm cannon. They may have significant effects on attrition for other 
missions like reconnaissance and should be incorporated. 
Another area is fire distribution command and control. Two options, perfect C2 and 
random C2, were used in the formulations presented but neither are totally representative of 
the way in which fire distribution is handled. The effects of battlefield awareness in the 
context of information warfare and digital communications technology on command and 
control should be incorporated into the module. 
The attack module described does not address the use of additional assets for 
suppression of enemy air defenses. Enhancements to incorporate lethal and nonlethal 
suppression of enemy air defenses should be investigated to make the attack missions more 
realistic. 
Finally, the types of missions attack helicopter units can perform needs to be 
expanded. The deliberate attack is the only mission discussed in this thesis. The development 
of modules to support other attack helicopter missions to include armed reconnaissance, air 
assault escort, and air combat should be accomplished. This type of research would also lead 
to the development of modules to support different types of helicopters in the conduct of a 
myriad of missions. 
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APPENDIX A. NETWORK SHORTEST PATH ALGORITHM 
• Algorithm Input: 
G = (N, A) {the network in linked node, forward star (FS) arc adjacency list} 
S {the starting node} 
T {the ending node} 
R {combat range of the attack helicopter unit - 1h of the total mission range} 
dij {distance from node i to node j in kilometers} 
w d {weight or relative importance of distance} 
W1 {weight or relative importance of threat where (w a + w 1 = 1. 0) } 
tij {perceived ADA threat level from node ito} on a scale ofO to 1, 1 being the 
highest threat} 
• Variables: 
TD(i) = E dij 
(i,J) E Pred List 
TR(i) L riJ 
(i,J) E Pred List 
(
d .. ) 
= w _1!, + w t .. d R t 1J 
{total distance at node i based on the optimal path 
from the predecessor list} 
{total risk at node i based on the optimal path} 
{arc (i,j) cost} 
Note: The calculation for cost is based on weighted values for arc distance and threat 
level. The distance is normalized for combat rangeR to give it the same relative order of 
magnitude (0 to 1) as the threat level. 
• Output: 
MinPath {the path from the predecessor list} 
Dist {total dist from S to T based on optimal path} 
Total Risk {total ADA risk from Sto Tbased on optimal path} 
1. begin 
2. TD(S) = 0; 
3. TDG) = oo; for allj EN-S 
4. TR(S) = 0; 
5. TRG) = oo; for allj EN-S 
6. R = Combat Range 
7. LIST-S; {assumed to be a FIFO queue} 
8. while LIST * nil do 
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9. begin 
10. remove element i from LIST; 
11. for each arc (i, j) E FS(i) do 
12. begin 
13. ifTD(i) + dij ~ R then 
14. begin 
15. if TRG) > TR(i) + rij then 
16. begin 
17. TRG) = TR(i) + rij; 
18. TDG) = TD(i) + ~j; 
19. predG) .... i; 
20. ifj €1: LIST then addj to LIST; 
21. end if; 
22. end if; 
23. end for, 
24. end while; 
25. ifTD(t) < oo then {tis within range; TD(t) = oo if node tis not within rangeR} 
26. begin 
27. build pat~t from pred list corresponding to min risk path; 
28. Output: MinPath = pat~t, Dist = TD(t), and Total Risk= TR(t); 
29. else 
30. MinPath does not exist- the destination node tis not within range; 
31. end if; 
32. end. 
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APPENDIX B. ARC AND NODE INDEX FOR THE 24-NODE NETWORK 
The 24-node network below is a portion of the 64-node network developed to 
represent the Korea Major Regional Contingency (Schmidt, 1993). The risk values associated 
with each arc were calculated using formulas in Chapter III to support the demonstration as 
described in Chapter IV. Arcs are represented as node pairs (i- j). The arcs that are shown 
as (i- i') represent split nodes that have associated areas. 
Network Incident Node Listing 
node incident nodes 
9 10, 13, 14, 19 
10 9,14,22 
13 9, 18, 19 
14 9,10,20 
16 17,28 
17 16, 18, 26 
18 13, 17, 19, 26, 27 
19 9, 13, 18, 20, 
20 14, 19, 21, 29, 30 
21 20,23 
22 10,23 
23 21, 22, 30, 35 
26 17,18,27,28 
27 18, 19, 26, 28 
28 16,26,27,29,32,62,63 
29 19,20,28,30,31 
30 20, 23, 29, 31 
31 29,30,63 
32 28,62 






risk 1 risk 2 risk 3 
Arc Dist (km) Priority to Dist Priority to Threat No Priority 
9- 9' 10 0.04 0.03 0.0339 
9- 10 80 0.32 0.74 0.5294 
9- 13 50 0.20 0.62 0.4121 
9- 14 40 0.16 0.72 0.4415 
9- 19 40 0.16 0.99 0.5770 
10- 10' 10 0.04 0.18 0.1091 
10- 14 50 0.20 0.73 0.4669 
10-22 30 0.12 0.15 0.1336 
13- 13' 12 0.05 0.46 0.2551 
13- 18 15 0.06 0.75 0.4035 
13- 19 20 0.08 0.72 0.4003 
14- 14' 10 0.04 0.37 0.2041 
14-20 20 0.08 0.20 0.1407 
16- 16' 10 0.04 0.02 0.0297 
16- 17 30 0.12 0.30 0.2092 
16-28 40 0.16 0.09 0.1238 
17- 17' 10 0.04 0.58 0.3107 
17- 18 30 0.12 0.12 0.1189 
17-26 15 0.06 0.66 0.3624 
18- 18' 10 0.04 0.85 0.4442 
18- 19 15 0.06 0.16 0.1099 
18-26 20 0.08 0.16 0.1218 
18-27 20 0.08 0.61 0.3462 
19- 19' 16 0.06 0.25 0.1550 
19-20 40 0.16 0.23 0.1932 
19-27 30 0.12 0.53 0.3238 
19-29 45 0.18 0.04 0.1100 
20- 20' 20 0.08 0.69 0.3833 
20-21 25 0.10 0.31 0.2065 
I 20-29 30 0.12 0.20 0.1601 
20-30 30 0.12 0.92 0.5176 
21-21' 16 0.06 0.39 0.2254 
21-23 30 0.12 0.86 0.4904 
22- 22' 8 0.03 0.65 0.3431 
22-23 20 0.08 0.74 0.4093 
72 
risk 1 risk 2 risk 3 
Arc Dist (km) Priority to Dist Priority to Threat No Priority 
23- 23' 10 0.04 0.02 0.0311 
23-30 50 0.20 0.72 0.4588 
23-35 90 0.36 0.59 0.4749 
26- 26' 10 0.04 0.49 0.2668 
26-27 25 0.10 0.84 0.4677 
26-28 50 0.20 0.01 0.1063 
27- 27' 10 0.04 0.77 0.4040 
27-28 50 0.20 0.85 0.5263 
28- 28' 30 0.12 0.00 0.0600 
28-29 80 0.32 0.11 0.2143 
28-32 30 0.12 0.00 0.0600 
28-62 55 0.22 0.00 0.1100 
28-63 70 0.28 0.00 0.1400 
29- 29' 10 0.04 1.00 0.5200 
29-30 25 0.10 0.45 0.2731 
29-31 35 0.14 0.54 0.3411 
30- 30' 16 0.06 0.16 0.1096 
30-31 30 0.12 0.41 0.2640 
31-31' 10 0.04 0.44 0.2393 
31-63 25 0.10 0.00 0.0500 
32- 32' 10 0.04 0.00 0.0200 
32-62 50 0.20 0.00 0.1000 
34- 34' 10 0.04 0.00 0.0200 
34-35 110 0.44 0.00 0.2200 
34-36 110 0.44 0.00 0.2200 
34-62 50 0.20 0.00 0.1000 
34-63 25 0.10 0.00 0.0500 
35- 35' 10 0.04 0.00 0.0200 
35-36 50 0.20 0.00 0.1000 
36- 36' 14 0.06 0.00 0.0280 
62- 62' 10 0.04 0.00 0.0200 
63- 63' 10 0.04 0.00 0.0200 
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